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PATENT REFORM AND DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT

ABSTRACT
This article presents a new method of analyzing patent
reform proposals through the use of differential impact
analysis.
Congressional efforts to address the crisis of confidence in
the U.S. patent system have failed up to the present day. If
Congress is to have any hope of passing much needed
legislative reform to the Patent Act, the supporters of
patent reform will have to unite behind a streamlined set of
proposals that directly address the most pressing and
unambiguous defects of the current patent system. To that
end, we have proposed applying a test of differential impact
to enable Congress to prioritize those reforms which will
discourage the acquisition and assertion of bad patents
without unduly prejudicing the interests of the holders of
good patents. The differential impact approach elucidated
in this article has at least three distinct advantages over
other efforts to rewrite the patent system from the ground
up. First, the differential impact approach provides a
mechanism by which to evaluate competing claims for
legislative resources. Second, the differential impact
approach is an appropriate response to the empirical
uncertainty surrounding optimal patent scope. Third,
differential impact is consistent with the need to take the
legitimate expectations of current stakeholders into
account.
KEYWORDS
Patent, law and economics, bad patents, differential
impact, uncertainty, information asymmetries, post-grant
review.
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“We can’t reject something just because it’s stupid.”
– Esther M. Kepplinger, Deputy Commissioner of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. 1
“Microsoft Patents Ones, Zeroes.”
–

THE ONION, March 25, 1998.2

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. patent system faces a crisis of confidence. There is a widespread perception that
changes in the standards of patentability, the increasing importance of the information economy
and the sheer volume of applications before the United States Patent and Trademark Office have
combined to overwhelm the patent system.
Bad patents and costly litigation lie at the heart of this crisis of confidence. Academics,
business leaders and government officials have all expressed concerns that too many patents are
issued for “inventions” that are obvious, vague or already widely used.3 In addition to patents
that should never have been issued, attempts by patent holders to extend their rights to devices
and services that bare little or no relationship to their initial patent application are equally
problematic because the scope of issued patents is hopelessly unclear.4
Technology heavyweights including Intel, Microsoft, and Oracle argue that although the
patent system is the foundation for the United States' global leadership position in technological
development, there is a pressing need to restore the balance between the rights of patent holders

1

Responding to the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See
David Streitfeld, Note: This Headline is Patented, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at 1.
2

Available at http://www.theonion.com/content/node/29130. The Onion is a satirical newspaper.

3

See, e.g., Patent Sanity is Pending, Los Angeles Times, December 4, 2005. See also, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY
(October 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
4

See infra Part I.
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and the broader social good of encouraging innovation. These companies fear that, rather than
encouraging the “progress of science and the useful arts” as required by the U.S. Constitution,5
declining patent quality and overly broad patent rights are reducing incentives to invest in
manufacturing, research and development.6 Even obvious beneficiaries of the patent system,
such as IBM which receives more U.S. Patents than any other company, strongly support calls
for patent reform.7
The technology sector’s calls for reform have begun to resonate in the media and in the
Supreme Court; yet efforts in Congress to implement patent reform legislation have repeatedly
failed. Editorials from several major papers decry that “there’s something rotten in the U.S.
patent system;”8 “the U.S. patent system is profoundly flawed;”9 and that “the nation’s patent
system is a mess.”10 The Supreme Court has recently heard cases on the scope of patent
injunctions,11 the limits of patentable subject matter,12 the status of patent rights in antitrust
proceedings13 and the application of the experimental use doctrine in clinical trials.14 In addition

5

The United States Constitution provides Congress with the power “To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6

See Get it now from Ebay, hostage to the patent trolls, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 16, 2006.

7

IBM, Patent Reform, available at http://www.ibm.com/ibm/publicaffairs/gp/patentreform.pdf. See also,
Brendon Chase, IBM calls for patent reform, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, 11 April 2005 (available at
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/0,39023165,39187609,00.htm).
8

The Problem With Patents, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 29, 2006.

9

Patent Sanity is Pending, L.A. TIMES, December 4, 2005.

10

U.S. Patent System Has Run Aground, THE BOSTON HERALD, July 24, 2005. See also, Monopolies of the
Mind, THE ECONOMIST, November 1, 2004, available at
http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=3376181&no_na_tran=1.
11

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).

12

Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4893 (2006) (Writ of certiorari
dismissed as improvidently granted).
13

Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (U.S. 2006)

14

Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (U.S. 2005)
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to these cases, the Court has also granted certiorari in KSR International, a case that calls into
question the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence in relation to obviousness.15
In 2005 Congressional Representatives Lamar Smith and Howard Berman, proposed a bipartisan reform bill that would have dramatically changed the patent landscape.16 However, that
bill was shelved at the end of 2005 because of time restrictions and the failure of the House
Judiciary Committee to negotiate a consensus between technology interests, the pharmaceutical
industry, and independent inventors.17 Undeterred, Representative Smith has again proposed
significant changes to the U.S. patent system, this time under the rubric of the Patents Depend on
Quality Act 2006, (“the House Bill”) introduced earlier this year.18 On August 3, 2006, senators
Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy introduced an alternative compromise bill intended to bridge the
impasse between various stakeholders (“the Senate Reform Bill”).19 Regrettably, both these
pieces of legislation seem destined to be shelved because of looming mid-term elections in
November.20

15

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4912 (U.S. 2006) (cert. granted). The Federal Circuit
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals arising under federal patent law. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002).
16

Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). (Introduced June 8, 2005, by Representative
Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property).
17

See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2005 – It is Over, PATENTLY O BLOG, December 8, 2005,
available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/12/patent_reform_2.html.
18

The bill was introduced on April 5, 2006. See Statement on the Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006,
Statement of Representative Howard Berman (D-CA), (available at
http://www.house.gov/list/speech/ca28_berman/Patent_Quality.html).
19

See Statement on the Patent Reform Act of 2006, Statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, (available at
http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=1642); Patent Reform Act of
2006, S.3818, 109th Cong. (2006).
20

As of the time of writing, there are very few legislative days remaining in the 109th Congress. For any
patent reform legislation to be enacted this year, the House and the Senate would have to enact identical legislation,
which seems very unlikely. If neither the House or the Senate Bill is enacted this year, it will not simply be held
over until the next Congress. The upcoming mid-term elections virtually ensure that the 110th Congress (20072008) will most likely begin to review all legislation de novo.
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These days it seems that everyone has an idea as to how the U.S. patent system should be
reformed.21 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)22 and the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS)23 have both issued comprehensive reports on the subject in the last few years; days if not
weeks of Congressional hearings devoted to patent reform; and there is an extensive law review
literature proposing reforms to the way patents are examined, changes to substantive patent law
doctrines, and structural reform of patent litigation.24 However, as the failure of the Patent
Reform Act of 2005 and the likely failure of the current House and Senate Patent Reform Bills
demonstrates, there may in fact be too many reform proposals currently on the table. What is
missing from the patent reform debate is a rational methodology by which Congress can
prioritize its reform agenda – this article addresses that gap by proposing a test of differential
impact for patent reform.25

21

An unrestricted search of the LexisNexis U.S. Law Review Database for the term “patent” within 5
words of the term “reform” yields over 700 hits, restricting that search to the last 5 years yields over 400 hits.
Significant literature in this area includes Jay P. Kesan and Andres A. Gallo, Why ‘Bad’ Patents Survive in the
market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61 (2006); Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
885 (2004); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907 (2004); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J, (2004); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks
to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the
Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727 (2002); Mark
A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001); John R. Thomas, Collusion
and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305; Robert P.
Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999).
22

FTC Report, supra note 3 (An analysis of the interaction of competition and patent law offering ten
recommendations for patent system reform).
23

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A Patent System for the 21st Century, (Stephen A.
Merrill, et al. eds. 2004), http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. (The
National Academy of Sciences report on the U.S. patent system was released shortly after the FTC Report and
contained seven key recommendations for reforming the patent system that closely parallel the FTC’s suggestions).
24

See infra Part I.B.

25

See infra Part I.B.
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The differential impact approach elucidated in this article has at least three distinct
advantages over other efforts to rewrite the patent system from the ground up. First, the
differential impact approach provides a mechanism by which to evaluate competing claims for
legislative resources. This is significant because without such an approach there is no way to
decide how a reform in relation to patent examination should be compared to a reform to the
structure of patent litigation. Second, the differential impact approach is an appropriate response
to the empirical uncertainty surrounding optimal patent scope. Many of the current reform
proposals proceed from the assumption that patents are either too easy to get, or too easy to
enforce – an assumption which is, as yet, unproven. In contrast, as discussed in detail in Part II of
this article, we do know with some certainty that bad patents are too easy to get and too easy to
enforce. Third, differential impact is consistent with the need to take the legitimate expectations
of current stakeholders into account. If the patent system is to continue to fulfill its constitutional
function of promoting rather than hindering innovation, we must tailor patent reform to address
the problems related to bad patents without unduly prejudicing the interests of the holders of
good patents.
Consequently, rather than attempting to strengthen or weaken the exclusive rights of
patent holders across the board, we believe that the highest priority should be given to those
reforms that have a differential impact: i.e. those reforms that are likely to raise the cost of
obtaining or enforcing a bad patent more than they raises the cost obtaining or enforcing a good
patent. The failure of the legislative reform efforts underscores the importance of prioritizing the
most important elements of patent reform – those with differential impact.
The structure of the article is as follows. Part I begins with an introduction to the
problems created by bad patents and introduces the differential impact test for evaluating patent

8
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reform proposals. To analyze which reforms are most likely to have a differential impact on bad
patents we need to understand why the patent office issues invalid and poorly defined patents
and how those patents continue to survive in the market place. Part II examines the origin of bad
patents and applies two different economic models to explaining their persistence. The first
model focuses on a potential infringer’s incentives to challenge a bad patent; the second model
focuses on a patent holder’s incentive to assert a patent. We explain bad patents as an emergent
phenomenon: they are the product of the apparently low quality of patent examination and the
complex, uncertain, expensive and time-consuming nature of patent litigation.
Part III then assesses the major patent reform proposals currently under consideration
against the test of differential impact in light of the economic models developed in the previous
section. The strongest conclusion of our analysis is that Congress’ highest priority for patent
reform should be the adoption of a system of post-grant review of patent validity. Post-grant
review will have a differential impact by significantly lowering the cost of challenging the bad
patents. The differential impact test supports the adoption of post-grant review which will
provide a low cost method of challenging patents which appear highly likely to be invalid or
hyper-asserted. A well designed system of post-grant review will not impose a significant burden
on good patent holders because those few good patents that are occasionally subject to review
are unlikely to be found invalid. Furthermore, post-grant review will actually benefit good
patents by reducing uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent quality.
Part IV explains how the differential impact test not only supports the idea of post-grant
review in general, but also how it can be applied to building a better model for post-grant review
than those currently on the table. Looking at post-grant review through the lens of differential
impact leads us to propose a very different kind of system to that embodied in current legislative

9
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and other proposals. In short, we propose (i) adopting a variable presumption of validity
depending on the level of review that a patent has been subject to; (ii) implementing a multiple
stage system of post-grant review with two distinct stages in order to balance the goal of greater
scrutiny for bad patents with the need to minimize potential harassment of good patents; and (iii)
bringing questions of claim construction into post-grant review such that both sides of the bad
patent phenomenon can be addressed. These proposals are all designed to ensure that post-grant
review provides a low cost way to challenge bad patents, but does not undermine the value of
good patents.

PART I. THE NEED FOR A PRIORITIZING TOOL
A. The Problem with Patents
Historically patents were intended to reward research and innovation; however, in its
modern incarnation, the U.S. patent system now creates numerous perverse effects that
undermine that central mission. Some of the more trivial illustrations of the perversity of the
modern patent system include patents such as the Tarzan Swing Method,26 the Beerbrella,27 a
Method for Exercising Your Cat (with a laser pointer),28 the Hair Comb-over Patent,29 and the

26

U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (issued April 9, 2002) (“A method of swing[ing] on a swing is disclosed, in
which a user positioned on a standard swing suspended by two chains from a substantially horizontal tree branch
induces side to side motion by pulling alternately on one chain and then the other.”).
27

U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 (issued Oct. 28, 2003) (“A small umbrella which may be removably attached
to a beverage container in order to shade the beverage container from the direct rays of the sun”).
28

U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (issued Aug. 22, 1995) (“A method for inducing cats to exercise consists of
directing a beam of invisible light produced by a hand-held laser apparatus onto the floor … then moving the laser
so as to cause the bright pattern of light to move in an irregular way fascinating to cats”).
29

U.S. Patent No. 6,257,248 (issued July 10, 2001) (patent for cutting or styling hair using scissors or
combs in both hands).
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Peanut Butter & Jelly Sandwich patent.30 These patents are silly, but they are typically of little
consequence except to prompt the question, “what else has the patent office been doing?” The
real damage to the effectiveness of the patent system is done by ‘bad patents’ – patents which
either should never have been granted, or are asserted well beyond their legitimate scope.31
The danger of bad patents is that they undermine the incentive function of the patent
system. The patent monopoly imposes costs on third parties who must either license patents or
expend resources to avoid infringing them. Where patents are properly granted and properly
asserted, the monopoly cost of the patent holder’s rights and her incentive to invest in innovation
are generally two sides of the same coin. However, the system creates perverse incentives if all
the advantages of a patent monopoly are in fact available to those who merely industriously
create or collect patents, as opposed to those who invest (directly or indirectly) in innovation.32 If
a baseball player could get a home run from hitting a foul ball, there would not be much
incentive to try to hit the ball into the field.
Bad patents should not be confused with so-called patent trolls. Popular and academic
discussion of patent trolls is commonly linked to questions of patent quality, but the issues are in
fact severable. We are not aware of any evidence that patent trolls are more likely to have or
assert bad patents than practicing entities. The key argument against patent trolls is not that their
assertions are necessarily invalid, but rather that they are in a position to negotiate licensing fees
that are grossly out of alignment with their contribution to the alleged infringer’s product or

30

U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 21, 1999) (“a sealed crustless sandwich”). For many other
examples see http://www.freepatentsonline.com/crazy.html.
31

The term ‘bad patents’ is defined more exactly in Part I-B, infra.

32
As the NAS notes in its 2004 report, “patents on trivial innovations may confer market power or allow
firms to use legal resources aggressively as a competitive weapon without consumer benefit.” See NAS REPORT,
supra note 23, at 95.
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service.33 The reforms addressed in this paper do not begin to address that problem, except in so
far as a particular troll is relying on a bad patent.34
The meritless assertion of patent rights diverts scarce research and development dollars
from engineering to lawyering; they also divert patent licensing revenue from the holders of
good patents. A proliferation of unmeritorious allegations of patent infringement and subsequent
litigation is clearly bad for defendants, but it is also bad for those companies that have invested
in innovation and rely on the patent system to protect that investment. The aggressive tactics of
the holders of bad patents increase the cost for good patent holders in signaling that their claims
of infringement must be taken seriously.
The availability of robust patent protection acts as a significant stimulus to investment in
research and development and innovation. However, when aggressive patent holders can extract
substantial license fees simply through leveraging the overwhelming costs and delays involved in
challenging a patent, whether good or bad, the incentives to get a good patent are reduced and
the overall burden of the patent system on society is increased.
Consider the hypothetical example of Carla, a small internet retailer. Just before the
critical holiday retail season, Carla receives a letter from a patent licensing firm. The letter states
that the firm is willing to negotiate a license, based on the firm’s asserted patent rights,
concerning a particular aspect of internet-based shopping cart checkout technology.

The firm

offers the license for an annual fee of $50,000.
33

See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking (2006), (Working paper on
file with the authors.)
34

In spite of its widespread use, the exact definition of the term patent troll is disputed. See, e.g., eBay v.
MercXchange oral argument, Wednesday, March 29, 2006, Justice Kennedy “Well, is the troll the scary thing under
the bridge, or is it a fishing technique?” p.7 lines 4 – 6. Note that Section 5 of the Senate Bill attempts to codify an
“apportionment” rule for the calculation of damages for patent infringement that would reduce the leverage of socalled patent trolls.
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Carla is suspicious of the validity of the patent because the claimed invention seems too
broad and abstract. She is also suspicious because the idea of this electronic shopping cart
technology has been in common use for so long that it does not seem like something she would
equate with patented technology. Armed with these suspicions, Carla asks Jane, a friendly patent
lawyer, for some help. After reviewing the letter and the patent, Jane offers several pieces of
information and advice: (1) the patent should probably never have been issued for a number of
reasons, most obviously because it was “anticipated” by an earlier invention that the patent office
examiner was not aware of;35 (2) for $30,000, Carla can get an opinion letter that says the patent
is invalid and that even if it was valid, she does not infringe it;36 (3) without such a letter, Carla
may be liable for triple damages and attorney’s fees for the entire period since she received the
patent holder’s letter if she is later found to infringe the patent;37 (4) Carla probably can’t go to
court to have the patent declared invalid because she lacks standing for declaratory judgment;38
(5) even if Carla could persuade a court to hear her case, it would probably cost her around
$650,000 to invalidate the patent (give or take a few hundred thousand dollars);39 (6) given that
the patent is likely flawed, Carla could submit it to the patent office for an administrative process
known as reexamination – but if she does, she either won’t be able to participate meaningfully in

35

35 U.S.C. § 102 (Novelty).

36

AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 102 (2005) [Hereinafter,
AIPLA Econ. Survey]. Although the average cost of a patent opinion from a mid-sized firm is $23,997, prices as
high as $40,000 are not uncommon in areas such as New York City.
37

See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2004). The remedy for willful infringement is based on 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed”) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (“the court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”).
38

Vermeer Mfg. Co. v. Deere & Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 645 (D. Del. 2005) (patent holder did not create a
reasonable apprehension of suit through a letter stating that the patent holder would enforce its patent rights and that
the opposing party appeared to infringe on the patent).
39

AIPLA Econ. Survey, supra note 36 at 108.
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that reexamination process;40 or worse still, if she incorrectly loses in the patent office, she won’t
be able to make the same arguments again in any later court proceeding.41 In the end, Jane
cheerfully suggests that Carla should consider paying the $50,000, regardless of the likely
invalidity of the patent.
This is the real perversity of the current patent system: rational actors will license patents
they strongly suspect are either invalid, or simply do not apply to them, because all the
alternatives are worse.
B. A Differential Impact on Bad Patents
Congress faces a dizzying array of options when it comes to overhauling the patent
system, but what is lacking from the patent reform debate so far is a framework for prioritizing
these reforms. This article addresses that need by proposing that Congress should apply the
differential impact test to determine which reforms are most pressing. We argue that the highest
priority for patent reform should be reserved for those measures that will have a differential
impact on bad patents. This raises two questions: first, what is it about a patent that makes it bad;
and second, what is differential impact?
1. Defining Bad Patents
For all the discussion of falling patent quality and opportunistic litigation, there appears
to be no agreed upon definition of what makes a patent “bad.” The term is often used loosely to

40

The Patent Act provides for both ex parte reexaminations under 35 U.S.C. § 302 and inter partes
reexamination under 35 U.S.C. § 311. The Act also provides for Commissioner ordered reexaminations under 35
U.S.C. § 303(a). See generally UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Report to Congress on
Inter Partes Reexamination, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam_report.htm (last visited
__).
41

The Patent Act provides that any issue raised by a challenger during reexamination cannot be revisited in
a later trial involving that challenger. See 35 U.S.C. § 317. See also Farrell & Merges, supra note 21, at 967.
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denote patents that should not have been issued.42 Patents can fail to meet the standards of
patentability despite being issued by the patent office.43 Currently, roughly half of all litigated
patent claims are found invalid by the courts for reasons such as anticipation or obviousness.44
Are all these patents “bad”? We doubt it. Defining bad patents solely with reference to standards
of patentability is problematic. For example, it is not uncommon for a patent to be found to be
invalid on the basis of prior art that the applicant could not reasonably be expected to have
known about.45 Similarly, the uncertain nature of claim construction makes predicting the
ultimate validity of any patent claim a speculative art at best.46 For these reasons we believe that
it would be over-inclusive to define bad patents as those patents that should not have been issued
given the wisdom of hindsight.
As an alternative defining bad patents as invalid patents, we propose a functionalist
definition of bad patents that focuses more clearly on those patents which are likely to distort the
allocation of resources. Clearly, part of the definition of bad patents must encompass patents that

42

See, e.g., Edward Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving Patent Quality, 77
S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (2004). (Defining bad patents as “patents that do not meet the statutory requirements of novelty
and nonobviousness.”). See also Katharine M. Zandy, Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right? A Goldilocks Approach
to Patent Reexamination Reform, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 865, 905. (Defining bad patents as “patents that are
likely to be invalidated if subjected to litigation or an administrative challenge.) Jay Kesan offers a more helpful
definition; he uses the term as follows: “a patent is “bad” if it should not have been granted by the Patent Office
after a reasonable search and review of the relevant prior art.” See Kesan 2002, supra note 21
43

Primarily 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Novelty), § 103 (Non-obviousness) and § 112 (written description,
enablement and best mode).
44

John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA
Q.J. 185, 205-206 (1998) (Reporting that, in a sample of 300 cases, only 54% of final validity decisions found the
patent valid. This analysis is at the patent level, not the claim level but the authors of this study treat cases with split
rulings on claim validity as two separate patents).
45

See, e.g., In re Hall 781 F.2d 897, 898-899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Holding that a single copy of a doctoral
thesis, properly cataloged in the collection of a German University Library qualified as anticipating prior art).
46

See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting) (Noting that
almost 40% of all district court claim constructions appealed to the Federal Circuit since Markman I were reversed);
see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (Describing the
process of claim construction as mayhem); Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9708 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
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a reasonably diligent applicant would have known failed to meet the statutory requirements of
patentability. But this invalidity in not the only way that patents go bad.
The BT hyperlink patent provides a good example. In 2002, telecommunications giant
British Telecom (“BT”) attempted to assert patent rights over the creation hyperlinks on the
internet. One of the many striking things about BT’s claims was that this patent was initially
filed in 1976, well before the technology they effectively claimed to own was invented.47 BT’s
U.S. Patent No. 4,873,662, eventually issued in 1989, describes a system where multiple users
can access data on a central computer by using remote terminals. BT claimed that this patent
read on the technology used in internet hyperlinks. BT contacted various Internet Service
Providers (“ISP”) and demanded license fees for the ISP’s actions, claiming those actions
facilitated the infringement of the patent by providing ISP subscribers with access to the internet.
When eventually challenged in federal court, BT’s infringement claims were dismissed on
summary judgment, with the judge holding that no reasonable jury could have found that the
scope of the patent’s claims covered internet hyperlinks.48 While the bad patent assertions by BT
were eventually removed from the market place, they were still able to cause significant financial
harm before they were formally rejected.
The second element of bad patents relates to patent scope. Even a technically valid
patent can become a bad patent if it is asserted beyond its legitimate scope. The BT Hyperlink
patent may well have been properly granted; however, it was the broad assertion of rights by BT
that made the hyperlink patent a bad patent.49 A patent that should not have been issued and a
47

See Kurt Kleiner, BT in Court to Enforce Hyperlink Patent, NEW SCIENTIST, February 11, 2002 ,
available at http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn1905; U.S. Patent No. 4,873,662 (issued Oct. 10, 1989).
48

British Telecomms. PLC v. Prodigy Commc’ns Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 399, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

49

On this theory, the patent did not become “bad” until BT argued for a claim construction that was
unsupported by the actual invention.
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patent that was validly issued by is now the subject of hyper-assertion both result in the patent
holder claiming legal rights she does not in fact possess.
In sum, the term bad patent should be reserved for patents that are asserted (by
implication or otherwise) to cover a product or activity that no reasonable fact finder (in
possession of all the relevant facts) could find it covered.

The reason for adopting this

functionalist definition of bad patents is that we are less about whether a patent turns out to be
technically valid, and more about whether it is used as the basis for an assertion of rights that is
objectively lacking in merit. These are the patents that undermine the incentive rationale of the
patent system.
2. Differential Impact
In his seminal 1958 review of the economic literature relating to the patent system,
economist Fritz Machlup concluded that:
No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state with
certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit or a net
loss upon society… If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible,
on the basis of present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing
it.50
Machlup was not suggesting that there is no evidence as to whether the patent system has
costs or benefits, but rather that there is substantial conflicting evidence as to the magnitudes of
those costs and benefits. Scholars generally agree that we are empirically uncertain about far too
many things to know whether expanding or contracting scope or availability of patent rights will

50
FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Study No 15, 85th Cong, 2d Sess. at 79
(1958).
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be beneficial.51 The interesting question is what we should do in the face of this uncertainty.
Machlup himself saw no reason why uncertainty should lead to policy paralysis; he argued that
regardless of the global uncertainty in relation to the patent system:
the student of the economics … need not disqualify himself as a judge of
proposed changes in the existing system. ... a team of well-trained economic
researchers and analysts should be able to obtain enough information to reach
competent conclusions on questions of patent reform.52
One of the most pressing problems in the patent system today is not that patents in
general are too easy to obtain or too easy to enforce; rather it is that bad patents are too easy to
obtain and enforce. The solution to this problem is not to simply make all patents less valuable.
Rather, the solution is to try and reform the system so that bad patents are more easily weeded
out without undue prejudice to good patents. Ideally, any change to the current patent system
must benefit companies that have invested in innovation and use valid patents to protect that
investment; it certainly should not harm them. In order to achieve this, we argue that the reform
proposals garnering congressional attention should be uniformly assessed against a test of
differential impact. The strong form of this test is that a reform must reduce the incentives for
obtaining or asserting bad patents without reducing those same incentives for good patents. The
weak version of the differential impact test simply requires that a reform reduce the incentives
for obtaining or asserting bad patents more than it reduces those same incentives for good
patents.
The differential impact test is necessary because of the empirical uncertainty as to the
optimum scope of patent rights and because of the need for a more targeted legislative proposal
51

See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839 (1990).
52

Machlup, supra note 50.
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that might have a better chance of being passed by Congress. There are many reform proposals
that might make sense if we were rebuilding the patent system from the ground up; but, if we are
pursuing less radical change, we must keep in mind the expectations of those individuals and
corporations who have already invested in the current system.
The objective of this article is to explain the need for differential impact analysis of
patent reform and to evaluate the current reform proposals against that test. However, in order to
make that possible, it is first necessary to understand why the patent office issues invalid and
uncertain patents and how bad patents continue to survive in the market place once they have
been issued. Accordingly, the next Part explores the origin and survival of bad patents.

PART II

THE ORIGIN AND SURVIVAL OF BAD PATENTS

Congressional action on patent reform should be targeted towards implementing those
reforms that are most likely to have a differential impact on bad patents: i.e. those reforms that
will reduce the value of bad patents without undermining the value of good patents. In order to
examine which reforms are most likely to have a differential impact on bad patents it is first
necessary to understand why, in spite of their best efforts, the patent office continues to issue
invalid and uncertain patents and how those patents are used in the marketplace. In this section
we use two different economic models to explain why some patent holders see value in asserting
patent rights that no reasonable judge or jury would ultimately vindicate. These models also
suggest which reforms are most likely to reduce this kind of activity without damaging the
legitimate interests of good patent holders.
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A. Patent Examination
The phenomenon of bad patents stems from both the apparent low quality of patent
examination and the complex, uncertain, expensive and time-consuming nature of patent
litigation. It is important to understand the relationship between these two factors. If only an
insignificant number of patents were improperly issued, it would not matter very much that
patent litigation was so expensive. In this scenario, only good patents would be issued and so the
burden of expensive patent litigation would fall largely on infringers with a real case to answer.
Similarly, if challenging invalid patents was simple, quick and cheap, it would not matter if there
were vast numbers of improperly issued patents. In this alternative scenario, alleged infringers
would be able to quickly ascertain the likely merits of the patent holder’s claim by attempting to
invalidate the patent. Knowing that alleged infringers will routinely test the quality of their
patents, patent holders would have a strong incentive to only make defensible claims of
infringement. In contrast the forgoing scenarios, the problems with the current patent system
arise because too many potentially bad patents issue and because it is too costly for alleged
infringers to challenge or test their validity.53 Accordingly, the problem of bad patents can not
understood in one dimensional terms, it emerges from the interaction of the features of both
patent examination and patent litigation.
Bad patents emerge from the patent office due to a combination of limited resources and
distorted incentives. Almost any patent lawyer will agree that the U.S. patent system is currently
overburdened: there are too many patent applications and not enough examiners to ensure that
the merits of each and every patent are properly assessed. In the 2005 fiscal year, the patent

53

Patents are potentially rather than categorically “bad” at the time they are issued because how they will
actually be used is not predetermined.
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office received over 380,000 new patent applications and issued more than 152,000 patents.54
Each one of those issued patents spent an average of two to three years in prosecution.55 Yet
during that time, the average patent was probably only examined for as little as 18 hours and at
most 41.5 hours.56
The patent office currently has 4,200 patent examiners, but plans to hire to hire 1,000
patent examiners a year for the next several years to augment its current staff. 57 Even so, given
the growth in the volume of applications over the last two decades and the likely turnover of
examiners at the patent office,58 the office will struggle to keep pace with increasing demands for
examination if no other changes are made to the system. The mismatch between patent
applications and examination resources has resulted in considerable delays in the time it takes the

54

These figures relate to utility, plant, and reissue patent applications; U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, USPTO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 18, (2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005.
55

Id. at 6. (“pendency — the amount of time a patent application is waiting before a patent is issued —
now averages more than two years. In more complex art areas, such as data-processing technologies, average
pendency stands at more than three years.”); see also, Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 21, at1500.
56

Id. Lemley cites various estimates of the amount of time spent examining the average patent ranging
from 18 to 8 hours. These estimates may be out of date. According to one examiner, the average initial decision for a
digital camera patent takes about 24 hours, to actually finalize the claims and approve the patent issues presumably
takes several additional hours. See Kevin Maney, “Patent Applications So Abundant That Examiners Can't Catch
Up”, USA TODAY, September 21, 2005. We can calculate the upper bound of examination time by dividing the
number of hours worked by examiners by the number of patents issued every year. Assuming 4200 examiners each
allocate 1500 hours a year to examination yields 6.3 million hours of examination. Dividing this by the 152,000
patents issued in 2005 yields 41.5 hours per patent.
57

Kevin Maney, Examiners Can’t Keep Up With Patent Applications, USA TODAY, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/kevinmaney/2005-09-20-patent-office_x.htm (comments of John Doll,
Commissioner for Patents, USPTO).
58

Patent examiners, on average, spend only three to five years with the PTO before leaving the Office.
This means that within a four year period, the equivalent of the entire current staff of examiners at the PTO will
have left. This points to both a continuing problem of staffing levels and also a problem with retention of
experienced examiners. See Randy Barrett, Report: Patent Office Should Become Federal Corporation, NATIONAL
JOURNAL’S TECHNOLOGY DAILY, Aug. 24 2005, available at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0805/082405td1.htm.
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patent office to issue a patent.59 The patent office currently faces a backlog as high as 885,000
applications, many of which have not even been assigned to an examiner yet.60 According to its
2005 annual report, the patent office estimates the average time it takes to get a patent to be
about 29 months, although the figure is much higher in certain fields such as software and
business method patents.61 Furthermore, the patent office reports that unless reforms are
implemented or the agency’s budget is expanded the current backlog will increase to up to five
years.62
As the patent office struggles with the availability of examination resources, it must also
face the recent extension of patentable subject matter into new fields. In the past 25 years, legal
and technological changes have combined to radically extend the application of the patent
system to new areas, including software, business methods and genomics.63
These new frontiers of patentability have increased the strain on the patent office in two
ways. First, increasingly permissive rules on patentable subject matter have led to a deluge of

59

The patent office allegedly told an applicant for a business method patent that its recently filed
application might take as long as 14 years to be examined. See
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/06/pto_first_offic.html.
60

Tricia Bishop, 43.5-month patent process not moving fast enough, THE BALTIMORE SUN, April 30, 2006.
(The increase has led to a backlog of 885,000 applications and the fear that some patents, despite the time frame, are
being granted without proper review). Victor Godinez, Patent System Under Scrutiny BlackBerry Case Highlights
Complaints, Backlog of Applications, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 26, 2006. (The agency has a backlog of
nearly 600,000 patent applications, and the stack is growing).
61

Tricia Bishop, 43.5-Month Patent Process Not Moving Fast Enough, THE BALTIMORE SUN, April 30,
2006. (It takes an average of more than three years – 43.5 months, to be exact – for the government to process a
software patent application).
62

See John W. Schoen, U.S. Patent Office Swamped By Backlog, Without More Funding, Wait Time Could
Top 5 Years, MSNBC, April 27, 2004. (available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788834/)(quoting Jon W.
Dudas).
63
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (issued March 9, 1993). (first business method patent, ruled
patentable subject matter in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
Jul. 23, 1998)).
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patent applications in those fields.64 Second, new subject matter patents are more difficult for the
patent office to examine because they can not simply turn to previously published patents to
begin the search for prior art. Furthermore, patent examiners are at a comparative disadvantage
in reviewing new technology because they can’t readily access outside expertise without
violating the confidentiality of the patent applicant.65 Even more remarkably, patent examiners in
many art areas are prohibited from searching on Google and other internet search engines.66 In
response to vigorous criticism of its treatment of new subject matter, the patent office instituted
new policies in 2000 and 2001 designed to improve patent quality in some areas.67 However, the
impact of the patent office’s new policies has been thus far difficult to judge.
In addition, the patent office has been affected by “technology creep.”68 Old
classifications such as electrical, chemical and mechanical inventions have been displaced by far
more complex fields like semiconductors, biotechnology and, nanotechnology. All of which
require far more specialized expertise.
Even taking into account its limited resources, the patent office has been criticized for
simply being too willing to grant patents. Arguably, the patent office’s internal culture and
organization predispose examiners to granting patents too easily. Factors that might contribute to
a culture of permissive patent issuance include: (i) patent examiners face no penalties for issuing

64

Jennifer A. Albert & Emerson V. Briggs, III, Strategies of Tech Business Include Utility Patents, NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B23 (reporting that “the PTO has been inundated with patent applications during the past two
years and can barely keep up. It is generally understood that this increase in filings results from an influx of
computer, software, and Internet-based applications in the wake of the Federal Circuit's holding in State Street.”)
65

See Beth Novak, “Peer to Patent: Collective Intelligence and Intellectual Property Reform (2006),
(Working paper on file with the authors.)
66

Id.

67

See NAS REPORT, supra note 23, at 55-56.

68

See Schoen, supra note 62.
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ultimately bad patents;69 (ii) patent examiners are only rewarded for initial response to, and final
determinations of, patent applications;70 and (iii) continuation, continuation-in-part, and
divisional applications can be used to wear down an examiner until at least some claims issue.71
The imperfect nature of patent examination is widely acknowledged; even the patent
office acknowledges that its error rate is around 5%,72 although many believe that number to be
much, much higher.73 The FTC reports that the patent office’s approval rate might be as high as
98%.74 This is compared with a 67% approval rate in Europe and 64% in Japan.75 The patent
office argues that the true figure is more like a 75% approval rate or even a 60% rate.76
However, a study by Quillen and Webster (adopted by the NAS) found that, accounting for
continuations, continuations-in-part, and divisional applications, “the USPTO eventually issued
patents on between 85 percent and 97 percent of the applications filed between 1993 and 1998….
69

John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 733 (2001) (“Courts do not fine the USPTO upon invalidating
a patent; the examiners who allowed the case are not disciplined for their oversight; nor must the USPTO award
damages to affected members of the public to compensate for an improvidently granted patent. The costs of failing
to acquire information are simply shifted to other actors - in particular, the federal courts, the patentee's competitors,
and, ultimately, consumers.”)
70

John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 463 (2004).

71

Id. at 456-57.

72

U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002 18, (2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2002/1-58.pdf (Showing an official “error rate,”
based on internal quality assurance measures, of 4.2%. An error is defined as at least one claim within the randomly
selected allowed application under quality review that would be held invalid in a court of law, if the application
were to issue as a patent without the required correction. Some examples of errors include the issuance of a claim
having anticipatory prior art under 35 USC 102, or relevant prior art under 35 USC 103 that would render the
allowed claim obvious. Other errors include lack of compliance of the claim to the other statutory requirements (e.g.,
35 USC § 101, 35 USC § 112) and judicially created doctrines. The error rate is the ratio of patents issued with
errors to the total number of patents issued).
73

Allison & Lemley, supra note 44, at 205-206 (only 54% of the patents were found valid in a population
of 300 final validity decisions). While this is may be in line with standard assumptions about the selection of
disputes for litigation, the difference with patents is that they have previously been subject to a review process
before entering the pool for selection.
74

See FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 217.

75

Id.

76

Id. (75% approval rate); USPTO Director Jon Dudas, Address at 2005 AIPLA Meeting (2005), available
at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2006/03/does_the_wall_s.html (60% approval rate).
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This is “20 to 30 percent higher than official estimates [by the patent office], which have ranged
between 60 percent and 70 percent for 20 years.” 77 Whatever the reasons for the patent office’s
high rate of allowance might be, the fact that persistent applicants are almost always successful
does not indicate a high threshold of quality control.
The important policy question that flows from the imperfect nature of patent examination
is whether it is worth spending money to make patent examination any better. Patent lawyers
and a number of academics have called for better funding for the patent office to improve patent
examination.78 In contrast, somewhat like Dr. Strangelove,79 a few commentators have suggested
giving up worrying about the issuance of invalid and uncertain patents and learning to love a
system of quick-and-dirty examination at the patent office – the theory being that poor quality
patents will either be ignored by the market or dealt with through litigation.80 As Mark Lemley
explains:
Society ought to resign itself to the fact that bad patents will issue, and attempt to deal
with the problem ex post, if the patent is asserted in litigation. This result is admittedly
counterintuitive. It depends crucially on the fact that very few patents are ever the subject
of litigation, or even licensing. Because of this, money spent improving the patent office
examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining the ninety-five percent of
patents that will either never be used, or will be used in circumstances that don't crucially
rely on the determination of validity.81
77

C. Quillen and O. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent Office,
11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 1-21 (2001); See also R. Clarke, U.S. Continuity Law and its Impact on the Comparative
Patenting Rates of the U.S., Japan, and the European Patent Offices, 8 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 335, 33549 (2003).
78

Legislation has even been proposed to this end. See H.R.2791, To amend title 35, United States Code,
with respect to patent fees, and for other purposes. Sponsor: Rep Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr. (introduced 6/8/2005).
79

DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (1964) (Directed by
Stanley Kubrick, based on a novel by Peter George).
80

Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 21, at 1497; see also, Allison, supra note 70. See also, Kieff,
supra note 21. (Arguing that patent applications should be registered, not examined).
81

Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 21, at 1510-11; see also, Farrell & Merges, supra note 21, at
946 (“it would be a disgrace for a system to enforce a lot of improper patents. This need not mean that it is bad if the
USPTO issues a lot of invalid patents. Rather, the entire system of application, examination, issuance, negotiation,
licensing, challenge, and enforcement should be evaluated as a whole.” Lemley clearly recognizes that some
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Although the “rational ignorance” theory of patent examination is attractive, much like the
rational ignorance theory of voting (from which its name is apparently derived),82 its advantages
may be overstated. There are a number of reasons to suspect that bad patents are not effectively
dealt with by market and judicial forces, as explained in more detail in the next section.
B. The Persistence of Bad Patents
There would be no need to worry about improving patent examination if potential
infringers were able to instantly recognize bad patents when they saw them and if patent holder’s
viewed attempting to extract revenue based on such patents as a futile exercise. However, in
reality invalid and hyper-asserted patents are capable of generating significant revenues and thus
have a distorting effect on the allocation of resources in the economy. Indeed, as this section
explains, the delay, uncertainty and expense of patent litigation means that, alleged infringers
have weak incentives to challenge bad patents and also that patent holders have strong incentives
to over-claim their rights. Understanding these incentives is central to determining which
proposed reforms are likely to have a differential impact on bad patents.
1.

Weak Incentives to Challenge

Faced with the threat of litigation from the holder of a questionable patent, an alleged
infringer will choose whether to (1) pay the license fees the patent holder demands, (2) challenge
the validity or application of the patent, or (3) simply exit the market.83 One of the central
examination related reforms are worth pursuing, Id. at 1523-25, but his main contention is that the primary reform
goal should be “to strengthen the validity inquiry made by the trial courts.” Id. at 1532.); Critical responses to
Lemley’s “rational ignorance” theory include Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of
Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004).
82

See Anthony Downs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).

83

Exiting the market may mean that the alleged infringer abandons a line of business altogether or designs
around the patent (thus exiting the patent market, but not the product market).
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problems with the current patent system is that there are many circumstances in which these
choices will be dictated by the cost of litigation, not the validity of the patent holder’s claims. In
fact, the models discussed in this section demonstrate that as the cost of litigation increases, the
validity of the asserted patent becomes less and less relevant to the alleged infringer’s decision to
challenge.
Both Farrell & Merges and Kesan & Gallo have developed formal models to determine
whether litigation will adequately deal with the problem of bad patents.84 Their models are
developed from the point of view of a potential defendant who is faced with the choice of either
licensing, ignoring or challenging a patent holder’s assertion that some aspect of her business
infringes on the patent holder’s rights. We present here our own version of the challenger
focused model which illustrates why alleged infringers will pay license fees rather than challenge
bad patents in a significant number of cases.
2.

Challenger Focused Model

The model described in this section looks at the world from the perspective of a potential
infringer who has received some indication that a patent holder believes she is infringing and has
demanded a royalty payment accordingly. The alleged infringer must decide whether to take a
license, challenge the patent, or exit the field.

84

See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should
We Change? – The Private and Social Costs of Patents, at 21 (Illinois Law and Economics Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. LE05-004, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=688005; Farrell & Merges, supra note
21, at 943. (litigation is an poor substitute for adequate patent examination and calling for greater funding for the
Patent Office to improve patent review at the application stage); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic
Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. (2005) (exploring the suboptimal incentives of private parties to challenge patents in
courts and considering potential reforms); Miller, supra note 21 at 667. (proposing a regime of litigation-stage
bounties to encourage defendants to challenge patent validity); Edward Hsieh, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect
Method for Improving Patent Quality, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (2004) (proposing a mandatory joinder solution).
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Variable Definitions:
[

= Profit to the potential infringer over the lifetime of the product
(excluding any costs relating to the patent)

CL

= Cost of license payments.

CP

= Additional penalty cost of license payments after challenging the
patent and losing.

L

= Cost of legal challenge.

I

= Cost of gathering information related to patent validity.

P

= Cost of any damages as a result of losing a challenge to the patent.

\

= Probability that the alleged infringer would be able to successfully
challenge the patent.

Utility Functions:
UWin

= [–L–I

ULose

=

ULicense

= [ – CL – I

UExit

= 0

UChallenge

= \ (UWin) + (1– \) (ULose)

[ – L – I – C L – CP – P

When faced with the scenario above, the alleged infringer of a potentially bad patent will
decide whether to challenge the patent, take a license, or exit the field based on which is least
costly or most profitable. Generally, an alleged infringer will challenge the patent if her utility
from doing so exceeds her utility from simply accepting the license demands of the patent
holder: i.e. if UChallenge > ULicense. However, if both challenging the patent or accepting the license
would drive the alleged infringer out of business, i.e. if UChallenge> 0 and ULicense> 0, then the
alleged infringer will simply exit the field. There are a number of different ways in which patent
holders can obtain value from an individual patent or from a portfolio of patents: they can use
patents to exclude competitors from certain markets and thus charge higher prices (the exclusive
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strategy); they can use the threat of exclusion to extract license fees (the extractive strategy);
they can use the threat of retaliatory litigation to avoid paying license fees for activity that
infringes on the patent rights of another party (the defensive strategy); or they can pursue a
combination of these uses. These diverse applications can be accounted for in the model by
simply treating all patent holders as being like extractive, but acknowledging that exclusive and
defensive patent holders charge different kinds of prices. In effect, exclusive patent holders
charge royalties that no potential infringer could afford to pay. Similarly, defensive patent
holders charge royalties denominated in the royalties they don’t pay for other people’s patents.
On the other hand, extractive patent holders would prefer to get some direct revenue from their
licensing targets and so will price their royalties such that at least some potential infringers can
afford to pay them.
The CF-model holds that an alleged infringer will challenge the patent holder by
contesting either the validity or the applicability of the patent where her utility from doing so
exceeds her utility of simply accepting the license demands of the patent holder.
Challenge if:
UChallenge > ULicense
This inequality can be expanded as follows:
\ (UWin) + (1– \) (ULose) > [ – CL – I
\ ([ – L – I) + (1– \) ([ – L – I – CL – CP – P) > [ – CL – I
Expanding and restating in terms of L yields:
L < 6CL + (1-6) (CP + P)

(equation 1)

In words, the model shows that an alleged infringer will challenge the patent holder if the
cost of litigation (L) is less than the probability of winning (\) times the cost of the license plus
the probability of losing (1-\) multiplied by the penalties associated with an unsuccessful
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challenge to the patent such as increased royalty rates and enhanced damages for willful
infringement (CP + P).
Comparative Statics
This yields useful comparative statics.85 As the probability of winning approaches total
certainty, i.e. \ _ 1, the alleged infringer will challenge if litigation costs are less than the cost
of licensing.
Challenge if: L < CL as 6 < 1

(Comparative Static 1)

This makes sense intuitively, as successfully challenging the patent becomes more likely, the
costs of an unsuccessful challenge become less important. An interesting result from
Comparative Static 1 is that the alleged infringer’s potential profit appears to have disappeared
from the equation. But in actual fact, the alleged infringer’s potential profit is still significant as
determinant of CL, i.e. CL = f([). It is difficult to estimate what the average patent license
demand is, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it is significantly less than the minimum
threshold costs of patent litigation. Probably the most plausible method of valuing intellectual
property is to view it in terms of the present value of the future stream of economic benefits that
can be derived from its ownership.86 Under this method, royalty rates are directly tied to the
profits of the alleged infringer. In practice patent license fees are frequently determined by
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Comparative statics is a modeling technique used in economics and political science. Comparative statics

is the formal study of how the equilibrium or optimal values of the variables in a model are affected by
changes in the values of other parameters in the model. See Kevin M. Currier, COMPARATIVE STATICS ANALYSIS IN
ECONOMICS (2000).
86

See Russell L. Parr & Gordon V. Smith, Quantitative Methods of Valuing Intellectual Property, in The
New Role of Intellectual Property in Commercial Transactions 39 (Melvin Simensky & Lanning G. Bryer eds.,
1994). See also F. Russell Denton and Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex
Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1191 (2003). Reasonable royalties are usually
determined by the application of the “Georgia Pacific Factors.” See Georgia Pacific v. United States Plywood, 318 F.
Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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seemingly arbitrary rules of thumb such as the “25 Percent Rule” or reference to past industry
practices.87 Each of these methods is something of a “guesstimate”88 but it seems fair to assume
that methods of valuation that were not a function of the alleged infringer’s potential profit
would be displaced in the market by those that were.
Although the cost of a patent license and the potential profit of the alleged infringer are
closely tied, litigation costs are only weakly related to the alleged infringer’s potential profit.
According to a recent survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law Association,
litigating an individual patent case is likely to cost around $650,000 for a low valued patent and
up to $4.5 million for a higher value patent.89 It is not surprising that parties in high stakes cases
would spend more than those in lower stakes cases, but it is significant to note that litigation
costs are probably not sensitive to the amount in dispute (which is at least indirectly related to
the alleged infringer’s potential profit) below the $1 million dollar mark.
The stickiness of the lower boundary of litigation costs means that although licensing
costs will be directly related to the alleged infringer’s profit potential, litigation costs will not.
For example, a potential infringer contemplating challenging the validity of a patent has to
expect that her litigation costs will amount to at least around $500,000,90 assuming that her profit
is a mere $1 million and that a 5% royalty is customary in her industry, she has to weigh that
87

DENTON & HEALD, supra note 85. See also Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Patent Licenses, 12 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 423, 424 (2004).
88

Id. (citing Robert S. Bramson, Valuing Patents, Technologies and Portfolios: Rules of Thumb, 635
PLI/PAT 465, 471 (2001)).
89

AIPLA Econ. Survey, supra note 36 at 22. (For a patent valued at less than $1M over its life, the cost of
discovery alone approaches $350,000. For patents valued between $1M and $25M, the average costs rise to
$1.25M for discovery and $2M for complete litigation. For those patents which exceed $25M in value, costs
average $3M for discovery and $4.5M for litigation.). See also, Bronwyn H. Hall et al.., Prospects for Improving
U.S. Patent quality via Post-grant Opposition, (May 2003), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W9731.pdf
(Estimating legal costs of patent litigation ranging between $500,000 to $3 million dollars per suit or $500,000 per
claim at issue per side.)
90

AIPLA Econ. Survey, supra note 36.
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$500,000 litigation bill against a license demand of only $50,000. By way of counter-example, if
a potential infringer had an expected profit of $10 million, a 5% royalty would lead to a license
demand of $500,000, roughly the same value as the cost of litigation. The alleged infringer is far
more likely to litigate in the second scenario than in the first.
The fact that only a small proportion of patent cases actually end in a trial on the merits
should not make us any more comfortable with the high cost of patent litigation. In their recent
empirical study of the resolution of patent cases, Jay Kesan and Gwendolyn Ball find that
between seven and four percent of cases end with a final judgment in one form or other.91
However, the authors also find that a further seven to eight percent of cases are disposed of
through summary judgment. The high cost of patent litigation might be less concerning if those
cases that ended in summary judgment were considerably cheaper, but the evidence shows that
they are not. For example, examining patent cases filed in 1997, Kesan and Ball find that the
average duration of cases that terminated through a trial was just under two-and-a-half years but
that cases from the same year that terminated through a successful summary judgment ended
only about two months sooner.92 This indicates that the high cost of patent litigation is not
merely a factor in those rare cases that make it all the way to a final judgment; it also affects
those cases in which the defendant is able to win on summary judgment.
The sticky nature of litigation costs at the lower boundary means that the majority of
patent holder assertions will result in licensing costs that are far less than the lower boundary of
litigation, as illustrated in Figure 1. This figure depicts a density function of the distribution of
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Kesan, Jay P. and Ball, Gwendolyn G., “How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of
the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes” . (U. Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE05-027),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=808347. p. 30 – 34.
92

Id. at 61.
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potential patent cases in relation to the difference between litigation costs and licensing costs (CL
– L).93 We suggest that the vast majority of potential infringers will face litigation costs that
exceed licensing costs as represented by the shaded area on the left-hand side of the density
function in the Figure below.
Figure 1: Potential Infringers and the Difference Between Litigation and Licensing Costs

0

CL – L

Because the majority of patent holder assertions will result in licensing costs that are far
less than the lower boundary of litigation, the probability that an alleged infringer will challenge
any given patent assertion is effectively zero in a large number of cases.94 Recall that the
comparative static indicated that as the probability of success approaches 1, an alleged infringer
would challenge if litigation costs were less than licensing costs. Figure 2 maps the predicted
outcomes for a continuum of [ given the distribution assumptions in Figure 1.

93

The density function depicted here is merely illustrative; profit is not necessarily normally distributed.

94
Admittedly, some potential infringers may challenge in such a situation if they have a strong reputation
interest in not being seen to be an easy target. Nonetheless, the simplified parameters of the CF-model probably
capture the behavior of a majority of firms.
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Figure 2: Probability of Challenge
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The result depicted in Figure 2 reflects anecdotal experience: at low levels of profit challenge is
unlikely; at high levels of profit, challenge is very likely; there is a very small transition window
in between where the probability of success is relevant to the alleged infringer’s determination.
C. Implications of the Challenger Focused Model
The CF-model has at least six significant implications with respect to the survival of bad
patents. These implications are: (1) the probability of successfully challenging the patent
holder’s assertion is only a significant determinant of whether an alleged infringer will challenge
in a limited range of cases; (2) high litigation costs insulate bad patents from challenge; (3) the
uncertainties of patent litigation insulate bad patents from challenge; (4) information
asymmetries insulate bad patents from challenge; (5) challenges to bad patents are likely to be an
undersupplied public good; and (6) enhanced damages and injunctions have a chilling effect on
patent challenges.
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1. The Limited Relevance of the Probability of Success
The probability of successfully challenging the patent holder in court is only a significant
determinant of whether an alleged infringer will challenge in a limited range of cases. To begin
with, if the cost of licensing is lower than the minimum threshold of litigation, it never makes
sense to challenge. Furthermore, if the patent holder’s royalty demands are high enough, it
makes sense to challenge their patent in court almost regardless of the probability of success
(depending on the salience of penalties for challenging unsuccessful, discussed below).
2. High Litigation Costs Insulate Bad Patents from Challenge
Bad patents can remain unchallenged as long as the royalties demanded are less than the
minimum threshold of litigation. Patent holders are in the driving seat in this regard because they
get to determine what license fees they will demand, and they do so in full knowledge of the
litigation costs faced by alleged infringers. Strategic patent holders can also effect the alleged
infringer’s decision to challenge by raising the costs of challenging by seeking a temporary
injunction and/or establishing a reputation for demanding extravagant license fees at the
conclusion of fully litigated cases.95
The costs of litigation can not be measured purely in terms of lawyer’s fees. In most
cases, serious patent litigation distracts key personal from their core responsibilities. For
example, Research In Motion, the Canadian company at the center of the recent Blackberry
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The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay may allow district courts to take this into account when assessing
the equities of granting an injunction to patent holder. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (U.S.
2006) (Holding that the well-established principles of equity that require a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction
to satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief apply with equal force to disputes arising under the
Patent Act).
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litigation was described as “critically distracted” by the protracted litigation.96 Patent litigation
can also have a negative effect on relations with outside investors, either in terms of the stock
price for publicly traded companies or the availability of future rounds of venture capital
financing in smaller companies. The mere public announcement of a patent law suit can depress
the defendant’s stock price on average 2 to 3%,97 and sometimes much more.98 In addition, the
lingering cloud of patent litigation can be especially harmful to small firms, particularly those
firms with limited product diversity.99 The extraordinary length of time it takes to invalidate a
patent through litigation – 8.6 years on average – exacerbates this problem considerably.100
It is difficult to precisely measure the costs of patent litigation, but according to one
rough estimate, the total direct cost of patent litigation in the U.S. every year exceeds $2
billion.101 This figure excludes money actually paid by way of settlement or final judgment.102
As noted above, the American Intellectual Property Law Association Economic Survey places
the average cost of patent litigation at around $650,000 for a low valued patent and up to $4.5
million for a higher value patent.103 As long as the minimum threshold of litigation costs remains
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Troy Wolverton, RIM's Up, Still on the Ropes, THESTREET.COM, June 29, 2006, available at
http://www.thestreet.com/_googlen/tech/gamesandgadgets/10294275.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEN&cm_cat=FREE&c
m_ite=NA.
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Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence from
Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 223, 230-231, 239 (1994); see also Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of
Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 471 (1995).
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James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Lessons For Patent Policy From Empirical Research On Patent
Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 10 (2005); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the
Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 37–38 (2004).
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See Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Predatory Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44
J.L. & ECON. 573, 575-76 (2001).
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Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 21, at 1520. (Finding that the average time from issuance to a
final litigated decision on validity is 8.6 years).
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Id. at 1502.
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AIPLA Econ. Survey, supra note 36 at 22. (For a patent valued at less than $1M over its life, the cost of
discovery alone approaches $350,000. For patents valued between $1M and $25M, the average costs rise to $1.25M
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high, bad patent holders will be able to avoid challenge by simply pitching the license demands
below the cost of litigation. Any patent reform that reduced the minimum threshold of litigation
costs would greatly decrease the ability of patent holders to do this.104
3. The Uncertainties of Patent Litigation Insulate Bad Patents from Challenge
The CF-model addresses the potential infringer’s probability of successfully challenging
a patent as opposed to the validity of the asserted patent per se. A number of factors combine to
the result that the alleged infringer’s probability of winning and the probability that the patent is
valid are not the same thing. The alleged infringer’s probability of successfully challenging the
patent is not directly linked to validity because of the uncertain nature of patent litigation and the
considerable risks of judicial error. As a normative matter, most patent challengers are confident
that they should win, however the nature of patent litigation is such that very few can ever be
sure as a predictive matter that they will successfully challenge a particular patent. All litigation
is uncertain to some extent, but anecdotal reports from judges and patent lawyers indicate that
patent litigation is a particularly uncertain form of legal action.105
The Uncertainty of Claim Construction
Although there are many causes of uncertainty in patent litigation, the claim construction
process is probably the most significant. Claim construction is the critical stage of patent
litigation where the court decides what the words describing the patent holder’s rights actually
mean. Every patent includes “one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
for discovery and $2M for complete litigation. For those patents which exceed $25M in value, costs average $3M
for discovery and $4.5M for litigation).
104

The effectiveness of post-grant review in this regard is discussed at infra note 240 and accompanying

text.
105
See, e.g., Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH. REV., Apr. 28, 2004, at
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/04/wo_kline042804.asp (describing patent litigation as complex,
uncertain, and expensive).
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claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as her invention.”106 Theses claims
define the boundaries of the patent holder’s rights with respect to the invention. However,
because language is ambiguous and the path of technology is unpredictable, there will often be
disagreements between plaintiffs and defendants as to the precise meaning of the patent claims.
In the context of a patent claim, even seemingly straightforward words such as “a,” “or,” “to,”
and “when” become the subject of contested argument. In the recent Federal Circuit decision in
Phillips v. AWH,107 the court wrestled with the question of whether the term “baffles” should be
given its ordinary meaning as a “means for obstructing, impeding, or checking the flow of
something” or whether it should be read restrictively based on the patent’s written description to
exclude structures that extend at a 90 degree angle from the walls. To an outside observer this is
indeed baffling.
Before 1996, claim construction was regarded as a mixed question of fact and law,
however, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, the Supreme Court determined that claim
construction was a question of law. 108 By making claim construction a question of law, the effect
of Markman has been to significantly increase the Federal Circuit’s discretion in reviewing claim
construction.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not settled on a consistent methodology for claim
construction, leading to significant doctrinal instability and confusion at the lower courts.109
Indeed, Federal Circuit reversal of Markman decisions has become so routine that many judges
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35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).

107

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). See also Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004).
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and attorneys to wonder why they bother with claim construction hearings at all. At least one
district court judge has expressed the view that:
the only thing that really is predictable in this area of the law is that we district judges
will likely get it wrong, or at least that the Federal Circuit will say that we got it wrong.110
Confirming this pessimism, Christian Chu finds that for cases involving claim construction and
filed between January 1, 1998, and April 30, 2000, the Federal Circuit modified the district court
judge’s claim interpretation in 44% of the cases and reversed it in 30% of cases.111
Ostensibly, a Markman hearing should give parties a firm understanding of what subject
matter is covered by the patent at issue. Unfortunately, the significant chance that any claim
interpretation made by a district court judge will be overturned or revised on appeal dilutes the
effectiveness of the Markman process. In reality the scope of the patent is unclear at every stage,
from issuance through litigation and appeal. In essence, parties must proceed through the
decision making and litigation process with often erroneous claim and scope interpretations.112
The claim construction is also rendered uncertain for potential infringers by the by the
doctrine of equivalents. Under the doctrine of equivalents a court will extend the scope of the
patent holder’s rights beyond the literal language of the patent claims to cover an infringing
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Honorable Kathleen M. O'Malley, Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the
District Judge 54 CASE W. RES. 671, 672 (2004).
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Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001); see also, Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2-3 (2001) (“District court judges improperly construe patent claim terms in 33%
of the cases appealed to the Federal Circuit.”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 n.16 (Fed. Cir.
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See Moore, supra note 110. (“In the absence of a route for expedited appeal of claim construction,
district courts are forced to proceed with lengthy and expensive patent litigation based on their frequently erroneous
claim construction.”).
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product or process that is unsubstantially different113 or “performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.”114 The doctrine of equivalents
is intended to protect the patent holder from “unscrupulous copyists” who would otherwise
evade their rights by making minimal modifications to the patented product or process.115
However, in reality the doctrine of equivalents probably does more to protect patent holders from
the incompetence of their attorneys than anything else. The Supreme Court argues that the
inherent ambiguity of language and the unpredictable path of technological innovation require
some flexibility be extended to patent holders in the form of the doctrine of equivalents.116
However, as the Court acknowledges, the doctrine of equivalents itself exacerbates the ambiguity
of claim language.117 As Josh Sarnoff explains, the modern doctrine of equivalents extends a
patent's scope beyond questions of identity “whether the product or process is an embodiment of
the claimed category” – to the open-ended question of similarity.118
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel neutralizes the expansive effect of the
doctrine of equivalents with respect to claims that have been narrowed during the course of
patent prosecution.119 However, that doctrine itself is limited and uncertain. Consequently,
although the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel might in some senses be described as an
antidote to the expansive effect of the doctrine of equivalents, it is by no means an antidote to the
113

Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

114

Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).

115

Id. at 607.

116

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731-732 (2002).
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Festo 535 U.S. 732 (2002). (“the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of patents less certain.”). See
also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J 1157 (2004) (arguing for the abolition of the doctrine of equivalents).
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535 U.S. at 727 (2002) (When the patentee responds to the rejection by narrowing her claims, this
prosecution history estops him from later arguing that the subject matter covered by the original, broader claim was
nothing more than an equivalent).
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uncertainty and confusion that equivalents adds to the already uncertain arena of claim
interpretation.
The Presumption of Validity
A second significant cause of uncertainty in patent litigation is the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of the presumption of validity. According to the Federal Circuit, a defendant
seeking to invalidate a patent must do more than cast significant doubt on the patent’s validity;
she must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the patent is invalid.120 Although the
current Patent Act clearly establishes that an issued patent carries a presumption of validity,121 it
is only by virtue of case law that this presumption has been elevated to the high standard of
“clear and convincing evidence.” This heightened standard of proof might make sense if patents
were subject to a more rigorous system of examination, but given the very limited nature of
patent examination at the patent office, it is particularly hard to defend as a matter of principle.122
The clear and convincing evidence standard increases a potential challenger’s uncertainty
because although in theory a defendant could simply factor the heightened standard into her risk
calculations, the practicality of doing so is another matter entirely. Even if the alleged infringer
possesses what she believes to be “killer” prior art – e.g. something that shows that the supposed
invention had already been described in a printed publication well before the patent owner’s
claimed invention date – she must still ask herself whether this evidence will meet the gold
120

See, e.g., Kegel Company, Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Invalidity
must be established by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence).
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of a patent ... shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims ... . The burden of establishing
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”); see also, New England
Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The presumption acts as a procedural
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standard of “clear and convincing.” It is entirely possible that a reasonably competent patent
examiner would find that the prior art anticipated the invention but that a jury faced with the
same evidence would be unconvinced.123 Given that juries in patent cases are comprised of lay
people who are unfamiliar with both the relevant law and the relevant technology, it is hard to
confident ex ante whether the most convincing evidence in the world will actually prove to be
“clear and convincing” in a court room setting. This intuition is borne out in studies of jury
decisions in patent cases which indicate that patent owners are significantly more likely to win at
jury trials than otherwise.124
As the eBay case illustrates, once a bad patent issues it is much easier to convince the
patent office of its error than it is to defend an allegation of infringement at a jury trial. Although
eBay lost on the merits in federal court,125 it was far more successful in inter partes
reexamination in the patent office. In January 2005, the patent office issued an initial ruling
rejecting all of the claims contained in MercExchange’s online auctions patent; in March 2005,
the patent office issued an initial ruling rejecting all of the claims contained in the
MercExchange electronic consignment systems patent; and in May 2005, the patent office issued
an initial ruling rejecting all of the claims contained in the MercExchange multiple database
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See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99
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MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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searching.126 These were all patents that eBay had been found to have infringed in its jury trial in
the Eastern District of Virginia.127
The Effect of Uncertainty
The uncertainty of patent litigation is significant because it reduces the alleged infringer’s
expectation of successfully challenging a bad patent. Put simply, the alleged infringer may have
a well founded objective belief that a patent is invalid, but she can never be very sure of what the
patent claims will be taken to mean or how much evidence will be required to overcome the clear
and convincing evidence standard. This uncertainty clearly disadvantages risk averse parties and
it also makes patent holder threats to pursue litigation more credible because almost no assertion
of rights by a patent holder is too far-fetched.
4. Information Asymmetries Insulate Bad Patents from Challenge
Information asymmetries insulate bad patents from challenge by deterring alleged
infringers from challenging bad patents because of the extra informational costs they impose. An
essential problem with bad patents is differentiating them from good patents. When an alleged
infringer receives a threat letter, she may have very little information upon which to assess its
merits. In contrast, the patent owner generally has much greater knowledge of the validity and
scope of her patent. She knows things such as the amount of effort that was made to research the
prior art before the patent was filed, her success in extracting license fees from other targets and
the strength of the patent in light of the known prior art. She is also familiar with the patent’s the
prosecution history – including any narrowed claims.
126

See eBay Annual Report For FY 2005, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000095013406003678/f17187e10vk.htm#103.
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Note that the Federal Circuit also invalidated all claims asserted against eBay and its subsidiaries arising
out of the multiple database search patent, but reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
eBay’s favor regarding the auction patent. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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These information asymmetries are such that, at least at the early stages, a weak lawsuit
may be difficult to distinguish from a strong lawsuit. An alleged infringer can do a number of
things investigate the quality of a patent that is threatened against her: she can hire lawyer to
research the patent; she can hire engineers to research the technology; and/or she could gather
information on her own through public and private sources. All of these activities may change
her evaluation of how likely she is to successfully challenge the patent holder, but only by
increasing the alleged infringer’s information costs. Furthermore, some information asymmetries
can only be overcome through discovery, which means spending several hundred thousand
dollars on litigation.
5. Challenges to Bad Patents are Likely to be an Undersupplied Public Good
As a several commentators have observed, the Supreme Court’s Blonder-Tongue
decision128 creates an ironic public good problem for any individual who seeks to challenge the
validity of a patent. Although an alleged infringer must bear the whole burden of pursuing her
claim of invalidity, if she wins she must share the benefits of her labor with the whole world,
including all her competitors.129 This suggests that unless alleged infringers can find some
method of coordinating, they will not supply the optimum level of resistance to the demands of
patent owners.130
A related problem is that in some markets, the alleged infringer’s utility from
successfully challenging a patent may be overstated by the CF-model. Some alleged infringers
128

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (a finding of patent
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the patent case to the finish – especially if the patent owner offers an attractive settlement”).
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will be able to simple pass royalty costs through to the consumer, as long as their competitors are
also subject to the same costs.131 Furthermore, some alleged infringers may use the threat of
patent litigation as an opportunity to raise their rivals costs by settling patent disputes early at a
discount.132 If two parties are involved in patent litigation, and both realize that the invalidation
challenge will be successful, each party actually has an incentive to settle the litigation through
licensing. The patent holder’s incentive is obvious due to Blonder-Tongue: if she settles with the
defendant, she maintains some chance of enforcing the patent against future defendants. Not
quite so obvious the fact that is that the alleged infringer’s incentive to settle can be just as
compelling, even if her expectation of victory is high. An alleged infringer who settles cheaply
can not only avoid sharing her victory with her competitors, she can actually impose a higher
cost on those competitors if the appearance of settlement increases their perception of the
validity of the patent.133
Farrell and Merges point to the case of Gilbert Hyatt’s negotiations with North American
Philips Corporation as an example.134 Gilbert Hyatt was a non-manufacturing patent holder who
sought royalties from manufacturers in the LCD industry. Many of the targeted competitors
considered litigation, but Phillips Corporation chose to settle the dispute early, in return for
beneficial terms. As part of the settlement, Phillips agreed to help Hyatt extract royalties from
other competitors in the field.135
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Farrell & Merges, supra note 21, at 970 n32.
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Philips Licenses Hyatt’s Microcomputer Patents, PATENT WORLD, Dec. 1991 / Jan. 1992, at 15.
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Joseph Miller highlights a different example136 of the incentive-to-settle using the
Amazon “one-click” patent case against BarnesAndNoble.com.137 The district court found the
Amazon “one-click” patent not invalid and issued an injunction against Barnes and Noble’s use
of that feature on its website. However, the Federal Circuit later vacated the preliminary
injunction and concluded that Barnes and Noble had “mounted a substantial challenge to the
validity of the patent.”138 While not formally deciding the invalidity of the patent, the Federal
Circuit remanded the decision back to the district court with what amounted to a step-by-step
explanation of how and why the district court was to invalidate the patent.139 Instead of pursuing
the almost certain invalidation of Amazon’s patent in the district court, Barnes and Noble settled
the case, leaving the patent on the books as a credible threat against future booksellers who may
have sought to compete with Amazon or Barnes and Nobel.140
The combined effect of the public good nature of challenging a patent and the pass
through problem means that not only will potential infringers have sub-optimal incentives to
challenge a patent in the first place, but that even when they do it will almost certainly be in their
interests to accept a settlement at some stage before a final judgment is entered. Consequently,
even if bad patents are initially challenged, we should not be confident that potential infringers
will pursue those challenges to completion.
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Miller, supra note 21.
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Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 1228 (W.D. Wash. 1999), rev’d, 239 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1358.
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Miller, supra note 21 at 671-72.
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Id. at 672.
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6. The Chilling Effect of Enhanced Damages and Injunctions
The CF-model set forth in the previous section shows that the penalties associated with
an unsuccessful challenge become increasingly significant as the probability of successfully
challenging the patent falls. Since its formation, the Federal Circuit has tended to exacerbate
these penalties through its increased willingness to order preliminary and final injunctions,141
award enhanced damages for willful infringement,142 and its greater flexibility in calculating
patent damages in general.143
The possibility of a preliminary injunction can have a substantial chilling effect on a
potential infringer’s willingness to pursue litigation. The effect of a preliminary injunction has
been described as “the financial equivalent of nuclear winter” because of the economic hardship
and disruption it imposes on defendants.144 Furthermore, settlements and royalties negotiated in
the shadow of an injunction are likely to be distorted where the patent only relates to a small
component of some larger product (or service) but has the ability to holdup the entirety.145
Despite the Federal Circuit’s recognition that a preliminary injunction is “a drastic and
extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely granted,”146 the court now routinely issues

141

See Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Predatory Use of Preliminary Injunctions,
44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 575-76 (2001).
142

Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Imposing an
affirmative duty on potential infringer with actual notice of patent holder’s rights to exercise due care to determine
whether or not she is infringing those rights).
143

Roger D. Blair and Thomas F. Cotter Rethinking, Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2

(2001).
144

Julie S. Turner, Comment, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 205 n.102 (1998).
145

See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 33.

146

Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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preliminary injunctions147 in patent infringement cases.148 In a 1983 case, Smith International,
Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co.149 the Federal Circuit held that an immediate irreparable harm to the
patent holder should be presumed whenever the validity and continuing infringement of the
patent had been established.150 Since then, the court has further stated that “[t]he presumption of
irreparable harm [now] acts as a procedural device which places the ultimate burden of
production on the question of irreparable harm onto the alleged infringer.”151 This stance is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay,152 and will likely be reversed in the near
future.
The distorting effect of the threat of treble damages and attorney’s fees for willful
infringement is widely recognized. According to Federal Circuit case law, the application of
treble damages and attorney’s fees is appropriate where an infringer had “actual notice of [the
plaintiff's] patent rights” and failed “to exercise due care to determine whether or not [she was]
infringing” upon those rights.153 However, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “actual notice”
is so liberal that it can be satisfied by a company’s in-house engineers or patent attorneys
learning of the patent.154 The steroidal nature of willful infringement rule has three predictable
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The court’s authority with respect to preliminary injunctions is found in 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2005).
(“[C]ourts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of
equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent....”).
148

Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Predatory Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44
J.L. & ECON. 573, 575-76 (2001).
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718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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Id. at 1581.
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Reebok Int’l. Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994). (citing Roper Corp. v. Litton
Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Enhanced
damages are provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
154

See Note, The Disclosure Function Of The Patent System (Or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007
(2005). (Arguing that the Federal Circuit’s development of the doctrine of willful infringement undermines the
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consequences. First, a significant number of technology companies direct their personnel not to
read patents.155 Second, when they cannot avoid learning about the existence of a patent, many
companies will obtain non-infringement opinions in order to demonstrate their exercise of due
care in avoiding infringement.156 These patent opinions are an important source of revenue for
patent attorneys, but they make little or no material contribution to the alleged infringer’s
underling business.157 Third, some alleged infringers settle cases they might otherwise pursue
because of their fear of attorneys fees and treble damages.158
D. Differential Impact and the Challenger Focused Model
The CF-model illustrates that it is easy for bad patents to go unchallenged because of
certain structural features of modern patent litigation. High litigation costs; uncertainty in
litigation; information asymmetries; the public good problem and enhanced the enhanced
penalties of losing a court challenge all deter alleged infringers from mounting a challenge to the
validity of the patent holder’s rights. The cumulative effect of these factors is that the overall

disclosure function of the patent system by deterring innovators from reading patents to protect themselves from
treble damage awards in infringement suits.) See also, Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409,
1414-16 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
155

Id. (citing COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY: FED. TRADE COMM'N WORKSHOP 420-21 (Feb. 27, 2002) (statement of Jordan Greenhall), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020227trans.pdf.) See also, Timothy Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU
L. REV. 123 (2006). (Discussing various disincentives to read patents and patent applications)).
156

Id.

157

See, e.g., COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY: FED. TRADE COMM'N WORKSHOP 155 (October 25, 2002) (Transcript). (“Mr. Thomas:
First, we've heard that it supposedly incents opinion of counsel to guide accused infringers, but in fact, it's
pretty commonly known in the patent bar that most of the opinions produced by counsel are commonly known as
non-infringement and invalidity opinions because that's inevitably the advice that they give.”)
158

See, e.g., COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY: FED. TRADE COMM'N WORKSHOP 676 (October 28, 2002) (Transcript). (“Mr. Barr: …[T]he penalty for
so-called willful infringement makes [searching patents] a really stupid idea … there's a penalty applied to it if you
find patents that later on somebody says you infringe. You can be fined; you can be liable for triple damages.”)

49

PATENT REFORM AND DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT

incentive for any given potential infringer to challenge a patent is often very weak, even if the
probability that the patent is invalid is very high.
The CF-model predicts that an alleged infringer will challenge the patent holder if the
cost of litigation is less than or equal to the probability of winning multiplied by the cost of the
license plus the probability of losing multiplied by the penalties associated with an unsuccessful
challenge to the patent such as increased royalty rates and enhanced damages for willful
infringement. Or, in terms of the notation,
Challenge if: L < 6CL + (1-6) (CP + P)

(equation 1)

All other things being equal, the higher litigation costs rise, the less likely an alleged
infringer will be to challenge. As noted above, when probability of success is very high, the most
important factor determining whether an alleged infringer will challenge is the ratio of litigation
costs to licensing costs. If patent holders can keep their royalty demands at less than the cost of
litigation, alleged infringers are unlikely to challenge, no matter how confident they are of
winning. If the minimum threshold for litigation is several hundred thousand dollars, keeping
patent royalty demands below this amount is easy for the patent holder to do. If the minimum
threshold for litigation was considerably less, as it would be under the system of post-grant
review set forth in Part IV, it would be very difficult for the holders of bad patents to rely on
licensee capitulation.159
As discussed in the previous section, the CF-model shows that the alleged infringer’s
prospects of success are often not significant in deciding whether to challenge a patent.
Furthermore, even where the prospects of success are a significant factor in the alleged
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See Part IV, infra.
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infringer’s decision making process, they are only indirectly related to the validity of the
underlying patent because of the uncertainties of patent litigation and information asymmetries.
This is an important insight of the CF-model, but it is also important to understand that the lack
of relevance of the validity of the underlying patent applies equally to good patents as to bad
patents. Much of the reform literature advocates reducing the structural disincentives to
challenge bad patents without acknowledging the role these features play in protecting good
patents. The same factors that insulate bad patents from challenge are also a significant
component of the value of all patents – whether they are good or bad.
We can’t be assured that all reforms that make patents easier to challenge will in fact
have a differential impact on bad patents because, under the current system, the holders of good
patents have almost as much to fear from a challenge to the validity of their patents as bad patent
holders. This may seem counter-intuitive, but recall that the label “bad patent” is not
synonymous with invalid patents. Bad patents are those which are asserted to cover products or
activities that no reasonable fact finder could find they did in fact cover – either because the
patent was obviously invalid, or because the patent claims were obviously too narrow to support
such assertion.
Figure 3, below, represents four patents on a sliding scale of patent validity. The closer a
patent is to the left hand side of the scale the more likely it is to be upheld by a court. Consider
the following four patents, Patent A has a 95% chance of being found to be valid, Patent B has
60% chance, Patent C has a 50% chance and Patent D has a 5% chance.160 As illustrated in
Figure 3, Patent D is clearly a bad patent. In contrast, although Patents B and C may ultimately
160
Figure 3 is constructed in terms of patent validity, however, it could also be redrawn in terms of the
likelihood that a particular patent claim covered the alleged infringer’s business: i.e. while the infringer has a 95%
chance of being found to infringe Patent A, it only has a 5% chance of being found liable for infringing Patent D.
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be found invalid if subject to litigation, they are not bad patents.161 Many good patents will turn
out to be invalid (or not infringed) once put to the test of litigation because of the vagaries of
claim construction and other shifts in patent doctrine. Furthermore, a certain percentage of valid
good patents are likely to be incorrectly invalidated (or found not infringed) due to judicial error.
Reforms that uniformly lower the cost of litigation or make patents easier to challenge will not
only place greater pressure on Patent D; they will also significantly affect the value of Patent B
and Patent C which are not bad patents.
Figure 3: Sliding Scale of Patent Validity

Valid

Invalid
A

BC

D

The strong form of the differential impact test requires that any change to the patent
system will devalue Patent D, but will not significantly effect the value of Patents A, B and C as
represented in Figure 3. Differential impact favors reforms that will expose patents that are very
likely to be invalid (or hyper-asserted) to greater scrutiny but recognizes that even the holders of
good patents have a lot to lose from patent litigation. The CF-model is very useful for explaining
why bad patents survive, but in order to identify reform proposals that will reduce the value of
bad patents without affecting the value of good patents we need a model that focuses on the
patent holder’s incentive to assert bad patents rather than the alleged infringer’s incentive to

161

Again, the analysis is the same for hyper-assertion.
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challenge them. In the next sub-section we present an assertion focused model (“AF-model”)
which does just that.
E. An Assertion Focused Model
In this section we present a new model for analyzing patent reform proposals. Instead of
focusing on the potential infringer’s incentive to challenge a patent, this new model focuses on
the patent holder’s incentive to assert her patent, including the relationship of the incentive to
assert to the quality of the underlying patent. We begin with the proposition that a rational patent
holder will assert her rights so long as the expected value of assertion is greater than the expected
cost.
Variable Definitions:
a

= Probability of target accepting a license.162

[

= Profit to patent holder from licensing the patent.

T

= Cost to patent holder to locate and engage potential licensees (a.k.a.
targets).

R

= Cost to patent holder from retaliation by the target.

b

= Probability of retaliation by target.

The patent holder’s utility in asserting her patent is a function of the cost of finding a
target (T), the probability that the target will accept a license (a), the licensing revenue the patent
holder will derive if the target accepts the license ([), and the expected cost of retaliation (bR).163

162

a is the reciprocal of \ in the CF-model, see Part II.B.2., supra.
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Utility function:
The patent holder’s utility in asserting her patent can be expressed in terms of the
notation as follows:
UAssert: a([ – T) – (1 – a)( T + bR)
The possibility of retaliation is the cornerstone of this model. Every assertion of right by
the patent holder carries with it some possibility that the target will retaliate. When a patent
holder sends an infringement notice to an alleged infringer, she hopes that the target will agree to
her demands without complaint. However, with each new potential licensee the patent owner
also faces a risk that the target will not only try to evade paying license fees, but that they will
also attempt to reduce or entirely eradicate the commercial value of the patent. The most obvious
form of retaliation a target can inflict is to bring an action for declaratory judgment that the
patent is both invalid and not infringed. Other more subtle forms of retaliation include publicly
defying the patent, thus forcing the patent owner to either sue or implicitly acknowledge it is
unable to enforce its claims.
The patent holder will assert if
UAssert > 0
a([ - T) > (1 - a)(T + bR)
Restating in terms of the expected cost of retaliation yields:
Assert if: ER < (F> – T)/(1 - F)

(equation 2)

163

b is the probability of retaliation by the target, and R is the cost of retaliation, thus bR is the expected
cost of retaliation.
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The most important implication of this model is that where targeting costs are low and
the prospect of retaliation is small, this inequality will almost always be met. Accordingly, a
rational patent holder will broadly assert her patent in these circumstances, even where the
probability that any individual target will accept a license is low. In many cases patent holders
have an incentive to broadly assert patent rights regardless of the low quality of the patent or the
low probability that any one potential infringer will accept a license. Indeed, as the AF-model
predicts, technology industry leaders frequently complain that they are deluged with meritless
patent assertions.164
F. Implications of the Assertion Focused Model for Patent Reform
To reiterate, the AF-model provides some interesting insights for patent reform. The
model predicts that where targeting costs are low and the expected cost of retaliation is small, a
rational patent holder will broadly assert her patent, even where the probability that a target will
accept a license is low. The model also indicates that a patent holder’s incentive to assert her
patent increases as the target’s probability of accepting a license increases. Accordingly, patent
reform can have a differential impact on bad patents in any one of three ways: (i) increasing the
targeting costs of bad patent holders without increasing the targeting costs of good patent
holders, (ii) reducing the probability that alleged infringers targeted by bad patent holders will
accept a license without reducing the probability that alleged infringers targeted by good patent
holders will accept a license, or (iii) increasing the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad
patent without increasing the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a good patent. This final
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See, e.g., Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent
System, (Edited & Excerpted) 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1053, 1153 (2003) One general counsel lamented “if I had a
dollar for every letter that either we never heard from again or never responded when we wrote to them, we would
be rich.”
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possibility – engineering expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent – appears to be the
most promising option for the reasons that follow.
First, while creating a differential impact with respect to targeting costs is theoretically
possible, none of the reforms surveyed in this article (nor any others we are aware of) would
seem likely to have this effect.
Second, the potential to create a differential impact in terms of the probability that
alleged infringers targeted by bad patent holders will accept a license is limited because the
patent holder often has a significant degree of control with respect to that variable. Patent holders
who can choose the identity of their targets have a substantial degree of control over the
probability of retaliation. A target’s propensity to accept a license will depend in part on the cost
of the license, the more the patent holder demands from the target, the more likely it is that the
target will refuse to pay.165 A potential infringer’s propensity to accept a license will also
depend on how effectively it has been targeted, the more accurately the patent holder identifies
her potential targets and the more effort she expends to make her threats of litigation credible,
the more likely it is that a target will opt to license. For extractive patent holders, both of these
are factors within the patent holder’s control. So, in terms of the notation, a = f([,T).
Furthermore, sophisticated patent holders will seek out those targets with the lowest probability
of retaliation and/or the lowest ability to inflict significant retaliatory costs and send them an
“offer to negotiate a license” letters. Once a few licensees have signed up, the patent holder can
expect a (the probability that the target will accept a license) to rise and b (the probability of
retaliation by the target) to fall among new targets as word gets out that other licensees have

165

This is subject to the obvious caveat that the holders of bad patents must not seek license fees so low
that they tip off the target that the patentees claims are unsupportable.
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signed up or the patent holder develops a market reputation. This reputation can be as much for
litigiousness as for the quality of their patents.
Third, creating a differential impact in terms of the probability that alleged infringers
targeted by bad patent holders will accept a license also has limited potential because of
uncertainty and information asymmetries. In an ideal world a target’s willingness to accept a
license would depend on the nature of the patent assertion – they would reject bad patent
assertions and seek to invalidate them through litigation. However, as the CF-model indicates,
uncertainty and information asymmetries discourage alleged infringers from challenging patents.
In fact, because uncertainty and information asymmetries have a leveling out effect, they
increase the target’s willingness to accept a license from bad patent holders and reduce their
willingness to accept a license from good patent holders.166
In the face of substantial information asymmetries, a target is likely to over-estimate the
validity of bad patents and underestimate the validity of good patents. In other words, if all
patents look the same to an alleged infringer, their willingness to accept a license will be
unrelated to the underlying quality of the patent. If the holder of a good patent knows the patent
to be good, it is in her best interests to communicate this information to the target. Alternatively,
if the holder of a bad patent knows her assertions are lacking in foundation, it is in her best
interests to restrict any information about the quality or scope of the patent. But the problem
faced by good patent holders is that whatever steps they take to communicate the quality of their
patent to the target will be imitated by bad patent holders. It is difficult to conceive of reforms to
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See infra Part III.C.3.
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the current system that reduce a for bad patent holders without similarly affecting good patent
holders.167
Finally, although changing the patent system to have a differential impact on the
probability that alleged infringers targeted by bad patent holders will accept a license is
unrealistic, reforming it such that the expected value of retaliation faced by good patents starts to
diverge form that of bad patents is more feasible. The introduction of a system of post-grant
review will expose all patent holders to an increased threat of challenge – in terms of the model it
will increase b. But what is significant is that, as long as the system is designed correctly, the
expected costs of retaliation will fall far more heavily on bad patent holders than on good patent
holders. In terms of the model, RBad > RGood.168
We expect post-grant review to impose higher costs on bad patents because it allows
patents to be reviewed for obvious errors at an early stage. In our view, post-grant review will be
most effective if it operates as an alternative to litigation that seeks to weed out the most clearly
improvidently granted patents, as opposed to seeking to identify every single improvidently
granted patent. If this high threshold of invalidity is adhered to validly granted patents should not
be at substantial risk.169 We also expect post-grant review to impose higher costs on bad patents
because good patents will actually be advantaged by post-grant review. Post-grant review will
reduce uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent quality because patents that
survive post-grant review are more likely to be taken seriously in the market than ones that have
never been tested. In this way, post-grant review provides a signal of patent quality for good
patents that bad patent holders face great costs in imitating.
167

Id.
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Id.
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See infra Part IV.B.
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G. The Relevance of Economic Models to Patent Reform
In Part I of this article we argued that Congressional action on patent reform should be
targeted towards implementing those reforms that are most likely to have a differential impact on
bad patents. In aspiration, patents are issued to the creators of new, useful and non-obvious
inventions to give them an incentive to invest resources in innovation where they would not do
so otherwise. In reality, a considerable number of patents are issued that do not meet these
standards. In this Part, we sought to explain both the origin and survival of bad patents: i.e., why
the patent office issues invalid and uncertain patents and why some patent holders see value in
asserting patent rights that no reasonable judge or jury would ultimately vindicate.
The economic models discussed in this Part confirm experiences that are often reported
anecdotally by patent practitioners: first, alleged infringers often have weak incentives to
challenge bad patents (even if they are fairly sure they are invalid); second, patent holders have
strong incentives to over-claim their rights. Understanding these phenomena of the modern
patent system is central to determining which proposed reforms are likely to have a differential
impact on bad patents.
Commentators who rely solely on a variation of the CF-model may have over-looked the
fact that the same structural impediments that shield bad patents from litigation also protect good
patents from litigation. Thus, in spite of the fact that most of the reform literature sees lowering
the cost of challenging patent validity as an unqualified good, we are more sanguine. Reforms
that make all patents easier to challenge will not necessarily have a differential impact on bad
patents.
Because the CF-model does not necessarily tell us which reforms are likely to have a
differential impact on bad patents, we developed a second economic model focused on the patent
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holder’s incentives to assert her patent rights. The AF-model indicates that where targeting costs
are low and the prospect of retaliation is small, a rational patent holder will broadly assert her
patent even where the probability that any individual target will accept a license is low. The AFmodel is particularly useful in determining which proposed reforms are likely to have a
differential impact on bad patents – it indicates that exposing patent holders to retaliation when
they assert their patents has the potential to create a differential cost between good patent holders
and bad patent holders.170
Part III which follows directly applies the insights generated by these economic models
to a wide range of reforms to the patent system that are currently under consideration.

PART III.

APPLYING THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT TEST

Part I of this article explained the need for a clearer understanding of bad patents and the
need for a differential impact test. The essential purpose of the differential impact test is to
suggest which reforms to the patent system Congress should pursue as a matter of priority. As
discussed, applying a test of differential impact is necessary both because of the empirical
uncertainty surrounding optimal patent scope and also because of the apparent need for a more
targeted approach to patent reform legislation. In Part II of this article we applied two economic
models to suggest what kinds of changes might have a differential impact. In this Part we now
directly apply the differential impact test to a broad survey of patent reform proposals, including
those embodied in the latest version of the House Bill and the Senate Bill.

170

Further research is required to determine whether this is the basis for a true separating equilibrium.
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Congress has recently been invited to consider a wide range of tonics to cure what ails the
patent system, this sub-section briefly reviews some of the major reforms under consideration.
The cornucopia of reform proposals can be dived into three main groups, examination reform,
substantive doctrinal changes, and proposals to reform the structure and procedures of patent
litigation. These reform proposals are evaluated against the differential impact test in the
remainder of this section.
A. Examination Reform
The first group of reform proposals relates to the process by which patents are examined
and ultimately issued by the patent office. Given one of widely perceived problems with the
patent system is that too many suspect patents are issued, the simple solution appears to be to
improve the quality of examination thus removing bad patents at the source.
Indeed, the patent office itself has taken up the cause of examination reform, proposing
significant changes such as limiting the applicant’s right to file continuations,171 streamlining the
examination process by requiring applicants to designate representative claims for initial
examination,172 launching an online peer review pilot project that seeks to ensure that patent
examiners will have improved access to all available prior art during the patent examination

171

71 Fed. Reg. 48, Proposed Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, Notice of proposed rulemaking,
(Jan. 3, 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr48.pdf. If recently proposed rule
changes are adopted, applicants who wish to file any kind of continuation application will have to support that filing
with “a showing as to why the amendment, argument, or evidence presented could not have been previously
submitted.” Id. The patent office hopes that the proposed change will “improve the quality of issued patents, making
them easier to evaluate, enforce, and litigate” and give “the public a clearer understanding of what is patented.” Id.
See also, Mark A. Lemley and Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63
(2004).
172

71 Fed. Reg. 61, Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, Notice of
proposed rule making, (Jan. 3, 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr61.pdf.
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process,173 and changing the rules relating to Information Disclosure Statements to encourage
patent applicants to give the patent office the most relevant information related to their
inventions in the early stages of the review process.174
The patent office has also recently proposed a new “accelerated examination” procedure
that would offer a final decision on patentability within 12 months to applicants who meet
restrictive criteria. Under the proposed rules, accelerated examination applicants must file
electronically, conduct prior art searches; submit all prior art that is closest to their invention,
identify all the limitations in the claims that are disclosed in the submitted references (with
accurate citations to the references), explain the relationship of the prior art to the invention on a
claim by claim basis, limit the patent to three independent claims and no more than 20 claims in
total. Accelerated examination applicants must also agree to have an interview with the patent
examiner.175
To the extent that a reform proposal merely calls for the optimization of current
resources, we consider it to be neutral in terms of our differential impact analysis.176 The harder
question is whether more resources should be allocated to patent examination. The problem with
simply throwing more money at patent examination is that it is unclear to what extent additional
resources will reduce the problem of bad patents. As Mark Lemley argues, while improving
173

See Beth Noveck, Peer to Patent: Collective Intelligence and Intellectual Property Reform (April 25,
2006). NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05/06-18 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=898840).
174

See 71 Fed. Reg. 36323, Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Matters, (10 July 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr38808.pdf.
175

71 Fed. Reg. 36323, Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications to Make Special and for
Accelerated Examination, (26 June 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr36323.pdf.
176

Reforms such as limiting the applicant’s right to file continuations, requiring applicants to designate
representative claims for initial examination, online peer review and accelerated examination procedures, are within
patent office’s discretion to implement and do not require legislative action. As such they are not the focus of this
paper.
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examination for the small fraction of issued patents that are actually asserted would clearly be
worthwhile, improving examination for the other 95% would largely be a waste of resources.177
Spending more money on patent examination requires have more money to spend in the
first place. If we assume that we don’t want to divert the necessary funds away from health,
education and national security; finding more funds for patent examination implies either
increasing patent filing fees or significantly increasing patent pendency.178 In that event, raising
the quality of examination may do as much harm to the potential holders of good patents as it
would to holders of bad patents. Good and bad patentees are each likely to be deterred from
filing applications as the cost rises and/or the pendency increases.179 We take no position on
whether raising the quality of patent examination in general is justified, but we do observe that it
is hard to justify from the perspective of the differential impact test because of the lack of focus
on asserted bad patents.180
In addition to changes initiated by the patent office, the House and Senate Patent Reform
Bills both propose three significant changes to patent office procedure. First, both the House and
the Senate Bills propose changing the uniquely American “first inventor” rule to the international
standard of “first inventor to file.”181 Second, both Bills also provide for Pre-grant opposition
which would allow third parties to submit references to the examiner during prosecution of a
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Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 21.
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Patent pendency is the time it takes the PTO to issue a patent once it the application is filed.
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It is possible that increasing the cost of obtaining a patent might have a greater chilling effect on bad
patents than good ones and thus may have a weak differential impact.
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It is possible that increasing the cost of obtaining a patent may have a weakly differential impact, if
higher quality examination would advantage good patents over bad patents.
181

Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Patents Depend on Quality Act § 3
(2006); Patent Reform Act of 2006 §3 and 4.
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patent application.182 If pre-grant opposition is expanded as proposed, third parties who are
concerned that a piece of relevant prior art has been overlooked by the applicant will no longer
have to wait for the patent to issue, they will be able to submit that prior art 6 months after the
patent is first published. Third, the House Bill provides for the mandatory publication of patent
applications.183 Most patent applications are already published after 18 months under the current
regime; the significant change contemplated by both the House and the Senate Bills would be to
make publication mandatory.184
The differential impact analysis we have elucidated in this article is generally supportive
of the examination reforms proposed under the House and Senate Bills. First, adopting the
international practice of awarding the patent to the first inventor to file an application is clearly a
long overdue rationalization of the current system. One advantage of a first to file system is that
it reduces uncertainty by prompting earlier disclosure of the invention to the public.185 A first to
file system is also advantageous because it would and harmonize U.S. patent law with that of
most foreign countries.186 Such harmonization would consolidate the ownership of patent rights
across national boundaries and allow for more streamlined examination internationally. Finally,
it should be recognized that there is no significant downside to adopting a first to file system
because the first to file is usually judged to be the first to invent in any event.187 Admittedly,
182

H.R. 2795, at § 8; Patents Depend on Quality Act, at § 4; Patent Reform Act of 2006, at §3 - § 4.
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H.R. 2795, at § 7; Patents Depend on Quality Act, at § 3.
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Id.
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But see Kieff, supra note 21. (Arguing that the increased incentive to file early in a first to file system
may cause inventors to file premature and ultimately invalid patent applications).
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151 CONG. REC. E1160 (Daily Ed. June 8, 2005). See also, Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Patent Practice
or Mere Compromise? A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty and a Proposal for a
“First to Invent” Exception for Domestic Applicants, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 259, 266 (2003).
187

Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-to-Invent System Has Provided No Advantage to Small Entities,
84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 425, 427 (2002) (between 1983 and 2000, the first to file won 1917 of
the 2858 interference cases).
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adopting a first to file system is not likely to have a differential impact on bad patents, but given
that it reduces cost and uncertainty for all patent holders at no cost to the public, we nonetheless
endorse this particular reform.
The second examination reform proposed under the House Bill is pre-grant opposition.188
Allowing third parties to submit references to the examiner during the prosecution of a patent
application should improve the quality of decision making for two reasons. First, patent
examiners will have access information that they may have otherwise overlooked. Second, the
mere fact that a third party has bothered to submit prior art sends a signal to the examiner that the
patent is potentially significant and that she should devote more resources to ensure a thorough
examination.
Allowing pre-grant opposition should have a differential impact because third parties are
likely to target patents that are both commercially relevant and may be easily invalidated by prior
art. Pre-grant opposition is likely to filter out some bad patents before they are even issued, it
should also ensure that the claims of patents that are issued are more carefully scrutinized.
Nonetheless, the overall impact of pre-grant opposition may be limited by its reliance on
sophisticated third parties who are able to monitor the stream of patent applications as they are
published and respond in a timely fashion. Furthermore, such a system would have to be
monitored by the patent office to ensure that it was not abused to simply delay the issuance of
valid patents in particular industries.
The third examination reform proposed under the House Bill is mandatory publication of
all patent applications after 18 months.189 Until relatively recently, patents filed in the U.S.
188

Patents Depend on Quality Act § 3 (2006)
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H.R. 2795, at § 7; Patents Depend on Quality Act, at § 3.
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would remain secret until the day they were issued by the patent office. This system was
advantageous to patent applicants because it allowed them to hedge their bets by maintaining
trade secret rights in the event that their application was ultimately unsuccessful. In 1999,
Congress passed the American Inventors Protection Act required that a patent application must
be published 18 months after its earliest filing date.190 However, the significance of that reform
was undermined by the broad exception for applicants who did not file their patent application in
any foreign publishing country: those applicants were allowed to opt out of automatic
publication.191 The relevant provisions of the House Bill will effectively close this loophole and
make 18 month publication the rule for all patent applications.192 Mandatory publication would
improve the patent system by reducing the possibility that third parties are taken by surprise by
an issued patent.193 If a company is aware that a patent that reads on their business may issue in
the near future, it has the option of negotiating a license with the applicant or to design around
the patent.194
Mandatory publication is likely to have a differential impact on bad patents because
secrecy is probably more helpful to bad patent holders than to good ones. Patents which are
made available to the public during the examination process are more likely to be subject to
scrutiny than those which are not. This exposure, combined with pre-grant opposition enables
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American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, amending 35 USCS § 122

(Confidential status of applications; publication of patent applications)
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35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B).
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Patents Depend on Quality Act, at § 3.
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But see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 33. (Finding that, in some cases where an upstream component is
patented, royalty overcharges arise even if the patent holder approaches the downstream firm before that firm has
designed its product.)
194

Id.
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interested third parties to supplement the examination of the patent office and should lead to less
potentially bad patents being issued.
B. Doctrinal Reform
The FTC, the NAS and the academic community have all suggested numerous doctrinal
reforms for patent law. Significant proposals include: raising the threshold of nonobviousness,195 narrowing the scope of willful infringement;196 lowering the burden of proof on
patent alleged infringers from the daunting “clear and convincing evidence” test to a more
rational “preponderance of the evidence” test;197 and curtailing the availability of injunctions for
patent infringement.198
Differential impact analysis has some interesting implications for doctrinal reform. What
may be most surprising to some in the academic community is that differential impact analysis is
largely unsupportive of reform substantive patent doctrines. Although narrowing the scope of
willful infringement is clearly advantageous in terms of differential impact, other reforms such as
raising the threshold of non-obviousness, lowering the burden of proof on patent challengers, and
curtailing the availability of injunctions for patent infringement can’t be recommended on this
basis. This does not necessarily mean that such reforms are ill-advised, but it does imply that
they should not be a legislative priority at this time.
195

See FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. (Recommendation 3 - Tighten Certain Legal Standards Used to
Evaluate Whether A Patent Is “Obvious”); See NAS REPORT, supra note 23, at 20 (Recommendation 2 Reinvigorate the non-obviousness standard).
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See FTC REPORT, supra note 3 (Recommendation 9); See NAS REPORT, supra note 23, at 117
(Recommendation 6).
197

See, e.g., See FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 11. (Recommendation 2 - Enact Legislation to Specify that
Challenges to the Validity of a Patent Are To Be Determined Based on a “Preponderance of the Evidence”).
198

See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property
Litigation, 44. B.C. L. REV. 509, 511 (2003). Another significant area not addressed here is the scope of the
experimental use defense, see generally, Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does The Public Get?: Experimental Use
And The Patent Bargain, WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004).
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1. Raising the Threshold of Non-Obviousness
The meaning and implementation of the non-obviousness standard has attracted a great
deal of attention in the context of bad patents. It is settled law that a patent should not be granted
if “the subject matter [of the invention] as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.”199 However, several decisions
of the Federal Circuit have combined to limit the capacity of the patent office to reject a patent
on the grounds of obviousness.200 For example, the Federal Circuit does not allow a patent
examiner to reject an application using general knowledge, common sense or the examiner’s own
understanding or experience unless that knowledge is “articulated and placed on the record” – a
difficult standard to achieve in some cases. 201 This requirement is intended to prevent the
examiner from indulging in hindsight, but it can also tie the hands of the patent office such that it
is unable to “reject something just because it’s stupid.”202
Whether or not the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit should raise the current
standards of patentability relating to obviousness (or patentable subject matter) is the subject of
legitimate debate.203 The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in KSR v. Teleflex to
address the question of whether a finding of obviousness should require proof of some
199

35 U.S.C. § 103.

200

Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System - Design Choices
and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 999 (2004).
201

In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (general knowledge); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (common sense, own understanding or experience).
202

David Streitfeld, Note: This Headline is Patented, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at 1.
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See, e.g., Br. of Twenty-Four Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curia in Support of
Petitioner, No. 04-1350 (Katherine Strandburg et al) (Available at
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/ksramicus.pdf) (Arguing that Federal Circuit’s current approach to nonobviousness, is at odds with the statutory language, inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, and contrary to the
goals of the patent system). But see, Cotropia, Christopher Anthony, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary
Lens: The 'Suggestion Test' as a Rule of Evidence (March 2006). Tulane Public Law Research Paper No. 06-03,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=893965 (Finding that the Federal Circuit has not narrowed the suggestion test).
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suggestion or motivation to combine prior art references.204 The doctrinal arguments in favor of
reforming the Federal Circuit’s approach may be persuasive, but it is difficult to justify the
reform on the basis of the differential impact test set forth in this article. The reason for this is
simply that changing the standards of patentability changes what constitutes a bad patent, as a
policy analysis tool, differential impact only makes sense if we take the existing standards of
patentability as given. However, taking a broader view, we believe that imposing a more
rigorous standard in relation to non-obviousness (and patentable subject matter) would more
closely link patent rights to activity that confers a benefit on society.
2. Narrowing the Scope of Willful Infringement
The essential problem with the willful infringement doctrine is that it allows a patent
holder to carefully craft an “offer to license” letter which puts a potential infringer on notice for
willful infringement but does not expose the patent judicial review. This oddity arises because
the Federal Circuit sets a high threshold for standing to seek a declaratory judgment on the one
hand,205 and yet imposes a low threshold for the notice required to trigger willful infringement on
the other hand. 206 Before a potential infringer can file a motion for declaratory judgment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, they must possess a “reasonable apprehension of suit.”207 Federal
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KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4912 (2006). Question Presented: Whether the Federal
Circuit erred in holding that a claimed invention cannot be held “obvious,” and thus unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a), in the absence of some proven “'teaching, suggestion or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary
skill in the art to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed.”).
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See note 207, infra.
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See, e.g., SRI Int'l Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs. Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Holding
that actual notice for the purposes of willful infringement may be achieved without creating a case of actual
controversy in terms of the declaratory judgment statute. The defects of the current doctrine of willful infringement
have been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere). See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L.
REV. 123 (2006); Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorney's Fees for Willful
Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291 (2004/2005); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's
Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003).
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O'Hagins, Inc. v. M5 Steel Mfg., Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1024-25 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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Circuit case law provides for the application of treble damages and attorney’s fees is appropriate
where an infringer had “actual notice of [the plaintiff's] patent rights” and failed “to exercise due
care to determine whether or not [she was] infringing” upon those rights.208 However, the
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “actual notice” is so liberal that it can be satisfied by a
company’s in-house engineers or patent attorneys learning of the patent.209
The steroidal nature of willful infringement rule has three predictable consequences.
First, a significant number of technology companies direct their personnel not to read patents.210
As technology industry representative recently commented:
[T]he penalty for so-called willful infringement makes [searching patents] a really
stupid idea … there's a penalty applied to it if you find patents that later on
somebody says you infringe. You can be fined; you can be liable for triple
damages.211
Second, when they cannot avoid learning about the existence of a patent, many
companies will obtain non-infringement opinions in order to demonstrate their exercise of due

Holding that “actual controversy” requires both “(1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which
creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and
(2) present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such
activity.”
208

Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Enhanced
damages are provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
209

See Note, The Disclosure Function Of The Patent System (Or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007
(2005). (Arguing that the Federal Circuit’s development of the doctrine of willful infringement undermines the
disclosure function of the patent system by deterring innovators from reading patents to protect themselves from
treble damage awards in infringement suits.) See also Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409,
1414-16 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
210

Id. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: Fed.
Trade Comm'n Workshop 420-21 (Feb. 27, 2002) (statement of Jordan Greenhall), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020227trans.pdf. See also Timothy Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU
L. REV. 123 (2006). (Discussing various disincentives to read patents and patent applications).
211

In the Public Hearing on Competition And Intellectual Property Law And Policy In The KnowledgeBased Economy., October 28, 2002 (Transcript). p. 676.
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care in avoiding infringement.212 Third, some alleged infringers settle cases they might otherwise
pursue because of fear of attorneys fees and treble damages.
The possibility of willful infringement increases the penalties for unsuccessfully
challenging an assertion of patent rights. Furthermore, the zone of immunity between vague
assertion and actions which create a reasonable apprehension of suit encourages patent owners to
broadly and indiscriminately assert their rights. In effect, patent holders who provide “notice” of
their rights that falls short of the declaratory judgment standard get something for nothing – the
patent holder raises the alleged infringer’s expected cost of challenging the patent without
increasing her own expected cost of retaliation. To quote one general counsel:
We worry about these letters because of things like the willfulness standard. It
would be great if I could just say this is ridiculous and throw it in the trash can.
We obviously can't do that. We engaged in a very reasoned analysis and, in some
cases, we get very expensive opinions of counsel which, in some cases, sit on the
shelf because you never hear again. In fact, most of the time you never hear again,
but that does not mean it is free to me.
We also get a lot of what I call "squirrelly" letters [which say] “We noticed that
you recently announced your such and such feature. We think that you might be
interested or benefitted from taking a license to our portfolio.” So are they
accusing me of something? Well, I do not know the answer to that, but I can
guarantee you if there is litigation, they are going to say they did, and I am going
to be dealing with that issue in litigation.213
The House Bill will have a differential impact on bad patents by aligning the standards
for willfulness and standing for declaratory judgment. The House Bill eliminates the willfulness
zone and reduces the incentives for patent holders to make indiscriminate “offers to license” by
212

See, e.g., In the Public Hearing on Competition And Intellectual Property Law And Policy In The
Knowledge-Based Economy., October 25, 2002 (Transcript). p. 155. (“Mr. Thomas:
First, we've heard that it supposedly incents opinion of counsel to guide accused infringers, but in fact, it's
pretty commonly known in the patent bar that most of the opinions produced by counsel are commonly known as
non-infringement and invalidity opinions because that's inevitably the advice that they give.”)
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Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System, (Edited
& Excerpted) 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1053, 1128-1129 (2003).
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narrowing the application of willful infringement. The House Bill narrows the permitted grounds
for finding willful infringement to cases where the patent owner presents clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer either intentionally copied the patented invention with knowledge that
it was patented or where the infringer received written notice from the patentee alleging acts of
infringement in a manner sufficient to give the infringer an objectively reasonable apprehension
of suit on such patent.214 The proposed legislation also restricts when a patent holder can plead
willful infringement such that no determination of willfulness can be made before issues of
validity and infringement are determined by the court.215 Eliminating the willfulness zone will
have a differential impact because patent holders will no longer be able to raise the stakes for
alleged infringers without increasing their own exposure to retaliation. This has a differential
impact because bad patents are more likely to be invalidated on declaratory judgment.
3. Eliminating the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
The Federal Circuit has interpreted the Patent Act’s presumption of validity for issued
patents to mean that a potential infringer seeking to invalidate a patent must prove by “clear and
convincing evidence” that the patent is invalid.216 This heightened burden of proof for those
wishing to challenge a patent’s validity is intended to safeguard patent holders from frivolous
and unsubstantiated attacks. However, the application this high evidentiary threshold is difficult
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House Bill § 6. The House Bill also provides that damages for willful infringement may be awarded
against a party if, “after having been found by a court to have infringed that patent, the infringer engaged in conduct
that was not colorably different from the conduct previously found to have infringed the patent, and which resulted
in a separate finding of infringement of the same patent.” Id.
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House Bill § 6. Also note that the court’s determination of an infringer’s willfulness shall be made
without a jury. Id.
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See, e.g., Kegel Company, Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (''Invalidity
must be established by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence.'').
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to reconcile with the realities of modern patent examination.217 We don’t know what proportion
of patents are wrongly issued by the patent office, but we do know that roughly half of all
litigated patents turn out to be invalid.218 As such, the clear and convincing evidence standard is
frequently considered a prime candidate for revision.219
Although we concede that the clear and convincing evidence of invalidity may have
outlived its usefulness, we do not recommend simply changing to the more common
preponderance of the evidence test. Lowering the standard of proof required to challenge patent
validity will not necessarily have a significantly differential impact on bad patents; instead, it is
more likely to decrease the value of all patents, regardless of whether they are good or bad.
Arguably, lowering the burden of proof with respect to invalidity may have a weakly differential
impact – i.e. one that would devalue both good and bad patents have a greater effect on bad ones.
Even if this is the case, it does not provide a strong basis for doctrinal reform. Lowering the
burden of proof for challenging the validity of a patent would certainly decrease the potential
extortion of bad patents, but it would also devalue the patent portfolios of every good patent
holder by making them more easily subject to unwarranted challenges. In Part IV of this article
we propose an alternative to changing the standard that would have a significantly differential
impact – a variable presumption of validity.220
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See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 21, at 1528. (“The presumption of validity has little if
any basis in fact. Examiners do not in fact spend long hours poring over a patent application or the prior art. They
spend very little time, and far less than either the lawyers or the triers of fact in infringement cases. They regularly
miss the most relevant prior art.”). See also, Mark A. Lemley, et al., What to do About Bad Patents. Regulation, Vol.
28, No. 4, pp. 10-13, Winter 2005-2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=869826.
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Allison & Lemley, supra note 44, at 205-206 (only 54% of the patents were found valid in a population
of 300 final validity decisions).
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See FTC REPORT, supra note 3.
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See infra Part IV.
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4. Curtailing the Availability of Injunctions for Patent Infringement
In eBay v Mercexchange the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s automatic
imposition of an injunction for patent infringement and held that “well-established principles of
equity require a plaintiff to satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant relief in the form of
a permanent injunction.”221 To obtain a permanent injunction a plaintiff must demonstrate: (i)
that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (ii) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (iii) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (iv) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
If passed, the House Bill will slightly amplify the effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
eBay. The House Bill reaffirms the equitable nature of injunctions and requires judges to act “in
accordance with the principles of equity” and to apply injunctions on such terms as they deem
reasonable.222 Significantly, the House Bill provides for an automatic stay of any injunction
pending appeal if the defendant is able to show that stay would not result in irreparable harm to
the owner of the patent and that the balance of hardships from the stay does not favor the owner
of the patent.223
The arguments for and against granting injunctions in favor on non-practicing entities
have been covered extensively in the legal literature and before the Supreme Court in its
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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). Note that the court also rejected any
suggestion that a patent holder who did not practice the invention or was willing to license the on whether the patent
holder was working the invention or willing to license. Id.
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House Bill § 8. This language does not appear in the rival Senate Bill.
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consideration of the eBay case.224 In terms of the differential impact test, it should be noted that
the ability to obtain a final injunction adds significant negotiating leverage to both good and bad
patents alike. There may well be good reasons to relax the Federal Circuit’s inflexible stance
toward final injunctions, but this particular reform is not a high priority in terms of differential
impact.225
C. Litigation Reform
In addition to changes to patent office procedure and substantive patent doctrines
discussed above, Congress is also being asked to consider major changes to the entire structure
through which patent disputes are litigated. Again, there is a considerable array of reform
proposals on the table ranging from providing incentives for third party patent bounty hunters,
facilitating collective action by alleged infringers, to creating an administrative review system
for determining patent validity as an alternative to district court litigation.
As discussed in Part II, the CF-model shows that the high cost of patent litigation
insulates bad patents from effective challenge in many cases. The AF-model shows the patent
holder’s decision to assert is directly tied to the probability that their targets will retaliate and the
potential harm that retaliation might cause. Both models indicate that changes to the structure of
patent litigation significant potential to affect the behavior of patent holders and potential
infringers. The question we address in this sub-section is the extent to which the litigation
reform proposals currently being debated are likely to have a differential impact on bad patents.
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See, e.g., eBay v. MercExchange, No. 05-130, Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors
In Support Of Petitioners (January 26, 2006) 2005 U.S. Briefs 130 (U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 2006); and Brief of Various
Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent (March 10, 2006) (2005 U.S. Briefs 130
(U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 2006)).
225

Arguably making preliminary injunctions more difficult to obtain may have a differential impact on bad
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1.

Fee-Shifting and Bounty Hunter Proposals

The three bounty/fee-shifting proposals reviewed below illustrate the diversity of
recommendations on the Congressional table. For example, John Thomas proposes encouraging
third parties to assist the patent office in its search for invalidating prior art by rewarding them
with a bounty for any relevant prior art that reads on the purported invention.226 Under the
Thomas proposal, the patent office would publish the patent application and invite the public to
submit prior art before the patent is issued.227 If application claims are rejected based on these
third party submissions of prior art, the submitting party would receive a bounty determined by
the patent office and paid by the applicant.228 As an alternative, Joseph Miller advocates a
litigation stage bounty.229 Miller suggests that third parties should receive a bounty in situations
where the “court voids a patent claim on a ground that the patentee could have prevented by
diligently and candidly researching, drafting, and prosecuting its patent application.”230
Jay Kesan offers a related, but distinct proposal. Kesan proposes a one-way, prodefendant, fee-shifting system in which the patent holder pays the costs of litigation if at least
some of the patent claims are invalidated on the basis of prior art which was reasonably
discoverable by the patentee during prosecution.231 Ordinarily a patent holder has very little
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John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 342 (2001).
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Id.
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Id.
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Miller, supra note 21. Miller argues that the Thomas proposal occurs too early in the process and that
third parties would be unable to determine whether the technology represented in the application is commercially
valuable. See Id. at 704.
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Id. at 707. (Miller’s bounty system would thus incorporate challenges to best mode, enablement, and
possibly inequitable conduct by the patent applicant before the PTO. Miller would seek to overcome the problems
he identifies in the Thomas proposal by tying the amount of the bounty awarded to the patent holder’s past profits.
This would provide incentives to challenge only those patents likely to be commercially valuable. Id. at 711-712).
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Kesan, Carrots and Sticks, supra note 21 at 787, 795
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incentive to diligently research the prior art or to submit only those claims that are likely to
survive litigation stage review. However, punishing the patent holder in those cases where
reasonable and diligent research would have suggested that the patent claims were invalid
changes the patent holder’s incentives at the time of prosecution. Patent holders who choose not
to conduct thorough prior art searches either during prosecution or before attempting to enforce
their patents would expose them selves to increased litigation costs if their claims prove to be
invalid. 232
The fee-shifting and bounty hunter proposals outlined above effectively raise the alleged
infringer’s expected gains form challenging a patent and/or lower the patent holder’s expected
gains from asserting her patent. The bounty hunter proposals are effectively penalties for
improvident patent drafting, whereas the Kesan’s fee-shifting proposal constitutes a penalty for
asserting an improvidently drafted patent. Both these measures may have a differential impact
because bad patents have a higher probability of triggering these costs on average.
However, there is a risk nonetheless that the fee-shifting and bounty hunter proposals
might be too aggressive in their attempt to enhance the incentives for challenging patents.
Penalizing improvident patent drafting should stimulate patent holders to improve patent quality
at the application stage; but, the resulting increased expenditure is not necessarily efficient given
that the commercial value of the innovation will often be unknown at that time of drafting. If
these penalties are reserved for those patent holders who fail to look for and disclose even the
most readily available prior art, then they should not trouble good patent holders too much. But,
if such penalties are more broadly applied, they may substantially raise the legal costs of all
patent prosecution in a way that discriminates more in relation to the budget constraints of the
232
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patentee than the quality of their patents. Indeed, reforms centered around bounties and fee
shifting may simply create disparities according to patent holder risk tolerance as opposed their
identity as either good or bad patent holders.233
Furthermore, larger companies are unlikely to view the bounty payoff as a significant
revenue stream. Therefore, their incentives to challenge will remain unchanged with respect to
the current system. Smaller niche firms may form solely for the purposes of submitting prior art
in anticipation of bounty payouts. This would be mitigated by the requirement of submission
fees, but still leaves open the possibility of continuing patent attacks by non-interested parties
based solely on financial reward incentives. Such a scenario inevitably leads to a low-quality of
third party prior art submissions and thus an increase of costs across the board for all patent
prosecution.
Jay Kesan’s fee-shifting proposal is more promising than the bounty hunter proposals in
terms of it differential impact. Ordinarily a patent holder has very little incentive to diligently
research the prior art or to submit only those claims that are likely to survive litigation stage
review. Fee-shifting would attack this problem by effectively punishing the patent holder in
those cases where reasonable and diligent research would have suggested that the patent claims
were invalid.
Fee shifting should have two significant effects. First, the prospect of fee shifting changes
the patent holder’s incentives at the time of prosecution. The risk of suffering an adverse award
of costs should make at least some patent applicants consider performing a more through prior
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Id., at 796 (Acknowledging that fee shifting imposes a heavier burden on poor companies which may
not be able to bear the increased costs of prosecution or pre-litigation search actions).
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art search during prosecution and/or before attempting to enforce the patent.

234

Second, the

prospect of fee-shifting should also reduce the incentives of potential infringers to settle strong
invalidation cases early.
Fee-shifting appears to have a differential impact because although all patent holders face
slightly greater risks when they attempt to enforce their patents, the magnitude of those risks is
tied the quality of the underlying patent. However, it should be noted that its actual effects in the
patent context are somewhat speculative. A study of the effect of fee-shifting in Florida medical
malpractice cases indicates that fee-shifting both encourages those with strong cases some
plaintiffs to pursue their claims while discouraging those with weak cases.235 If this also held true
for patent litigation it would mean that fee-shifting would have a clearly differential impact on
bad patents. However, there are at least two caveats about fee-shifting: first, there is surprisingly
little agreement among theoreticians as to the effect of fee-shifting on litigation in general,236
second, the few empirical studies that have been performed on the effect of fee-shifting have not
been in the area of patent law. It is conceivable that a study involving Florida medical
malpractice litigation may be subject to entirely different idiosyncrasies than studies of federal
patent litigation.237
The Senate Bill appears to have embraced the idea of fee-shifting, albeit not in the form
suggested by Kesan. Section 5 of the Senate Bill requires courts to award attorneys’ fees to a
234
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Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What does the Empirical
Literature Really Say? 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1943, 1950 (2002).
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Id. at 1950 (Kritzer summarizes the findings of a study of the effect of fee-shifting in Florida medical
malpractice cases as follows: fee-shifting “encourages some plaintiffs (those with strong cases) to pursue their
claims while discouraging others (those with weak cases). The result is to reduce the frequency of low-merit
claims.”).
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prevailing party in cases where the non-prevailing party’s legal position was not “substantially
justified.” The Senate Bill departs from Kesan’s proposal in two ways. First, Kesan proposes a
pro-defendant one-way fee shifting scheme, whereas the fee-shifting rule proposed in the Senate
Bill would apply to either the patent owner or the alleged infringer. Second, the Senate Bill’s
threshold of lack of substantial justification means that the provision is less likely to be invoked
than Kesan’s standard of undisclosed prior art being reasonably discoverable by the patentee
during prosecution.238
Although there are reasons to hope that fee-shifting will have a differential impact on bad
patents, fee-shifting alone is not a complete solution. First, fee-shifting does nothing to address
the issue of delay in federal court litigation. Second, fee-shifting is only effective if patent
holders have the resources to pay an award of costs. Finally, the prospect of fee-shifting may
have a chilling effect on the assertion of good patents held by risk-averse entities.
2.

Facilitating Collective Action

Carl Shapiro has suggested that one solution to the problem of bad patents is to make it
easier for government agencies with an interest in consumer welfare such as the FTC, or public
interest advocacy groups such as The Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Public Patent
Foundation to challenge the validity of suspect patents.239 Shapiro further suggests that the
antitrust authorities should make it easier for potential infringers to collectively defend their
rights by “making it clear that cooperative efforts to challenge patents will generally not be
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Kesan, Carrots and Sticks, supra note 21 at 787, 795.
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See Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1017 (2004), see also, Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, supra note 84 .
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considered illegal collusion, even when such efforts involve horizontal rivals who are seeking to
pay less for a technological input, or license.”240
Edward Hsieh proposes facilitating cooperation among alleged infringers by allowing for
the mandatory joinder of all potential defendants and thus consolidating all defendants in a single
action. He argues that mandatory joinder would lower the individual defendant’s costs of
litigation, reduce overall litigation costs, prevent patentees from suing smaller companies first,
and encourage defendants to challenge bad patents.241
Cooperative patent challenges and mandatory joinder are both aimed at solving collective
action problems relating to patent litigation. The difference between the two proposals is that the
first merely facilitates collective defense by potential infringers, the second is actually coercive.
From the perspective of differential impact, the problem with facilitating collective action is that
there is nothing to suggest that potential infringers will act collusively to defeat bad patents more
than they will act collusively to defeat good patents.
3.

Post-grant Review

The FTC, the NAS and a wide array of commentators have urged Congress to authorize
the patent office to administer a system post-grant review of patent validity (post-grant
review).242 The Patent Reform Act of 2005 and the current House and Senate Bills all adopt
variations of the post-grant review model.243 Post-grant review would supplement the current
third party and inter-partes reexamination systems which are rarely used because of their
240
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prejudicial estoppel effects.244 The Patent Act provides that any issue raised by a challenger
during reexamination cannot be revisited in a later trial involving that challenger.245 This means
that any potential infringer who tries to invalidate a patent through reexamination must be
willing to risk that the patent office will decide in its favor. The challenger has no opportunity to
litigate any argument or prior art evidence used in reexamination should the patent office make a
mistake. This estoppel effect makes reexamination extremely risky unless a potential infringer is
already engaged in federal court litigation.246
According to its proponents, post-grant review would drastically reduce the cost of
challenging bad patents and therefore help private parties fill the gaps left by an incomplete
examination process. In the words of Rep. Lamar Smith a system of post-grant review will
“provide meaningful, low-cost alternatives to litigation for challenging the patent validity.”247
Senator Orrin Hatch explains the need for post-grant review as follows:
Under current law, there are narrow reexamination procedures by which the PTO
may reconsider a patent’s validity at the request of an interested party. However,
current reexamination proceedings are very limited and do not allow for a full
consideration of a patent’s validity. As a result, even when reexamination is
available, potential litigants generally wait to challenge a patent’s validity until an
infringement suit has been brought despite the higher costs and prolonged
uncertainty of doing so… [B]y adopting a more robust post-grant review
proceeding we are providing a more efficient means of challenging a patent’s
validity in an administrative proceeding. This is necessary to address systemic
problems in our patent system, making post-grant review an essential component
of any meaningful reform legislation. While there appears to be substantial
agreement regarding the need for a more meaningful post-issuance review, there
are strong disagreements over its specific attributes and scope.248
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Post-grant review of issued patents has enormous potential to discourage and devalue bad
patents without undermining the value of good patents in three ways: (i) post-grant review will
provide a low cost method of challenging patents and thus prevent bad patent holders from
hiding behind the high cost of federal court litigation; (ii) post-grant review will increase the
expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent without (significantly) increasing the
expected cost of retaliation for asserting a good patent; and (iii) post-grant review will reduce
uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent quality.
First, by reducing the cost of challenging the validity of an issued patent in some cases,
post-grant review will make it more difficult for bad patent holders to simply rely on the high
cost of federal court litigation to insulate them from challenges. Recall that the main implication
of the CF-model was that the higher litigation costs rise, the less likely an alleged infringer will
be to challenge the validity of a patent. The CF-model also showed that in a large number of
cases, having a high probability of successfully challenging a patent was not enough to ensure
that challenge would in fact be made. When the cost of successful litigation is more the cost of
licensing, it does not appear to make sense to challenge a patent, no matter how sure one is that
such a challenge would be successful.249 Post-grant review is significant in this context because
it lowers the minimum threshold of litigation down from hundreds of thousands of dollars to
merely tens of thousands of dollars.
A high minimum threshold of litigation gives bad patent holders the flexibility to demand
licensing fees from multiple alleged infringers that are considerable but would not make it
worthwhile for any one alleged infringer to challenge the patent. For example, a patent holder
249
Admittedly, some potential infringers may challenge in such a situation if they have a strong reputation
interest in not being seen to be an easy target. Nonetheless, the simplified parameters of the CF-model probably
capture the behavior of a majority of firms.
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can usually demand $50,000 from 20 different alleged infringers and be fairly certain that none
will challenge the patent’s validity in court. However, if post-grant review allows a potential
infringer to challenge the validity of the patent for a mere $25,000,250 the patent holder can
expect to encounter serious opposition from potential infringers who believe that the patent has
obvious defects. In theory the holder of a bad patent could still attempt to play the same game
under a post-grant review regime, but that would require demanding almost negligible royalty
rates. Licensing demands that are pitched too low will immediately signal to potential infringers
that the patent holder has very little confidence in her ability to enforce the patent.
Second, post-grant review will also have a differential impact on bad patents by
increasing the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent without increasing the
expected cost of retaliation for asserting a good patent, or at least without increasing it
significantly. The AF-model discussed earlier indicates that increasing the expected cost of
retaliation reduces the patent holder’s incentive to assert her patent.251 It follows that increasing
the expected cost of retaliation for bad patents without significantly increasing the expected cost
of retaliation for good patents will reduce the assertion of bad patents relative to good ones. By
substantially reducing the monetary cost of challenging a patent’s validity, post-grant review will
expose all patent holders to an increased threat of retaliation when they assert their patent rights.
However, post-grant review still has a differential impact because the expected cost of that
retaliation should be much lower for good patents than for bad ones.
Post-grant review has a more significant differential impact than would be achieved by
simply lowering the cost of federal court litigation. Post-grant review is different to federal court
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See supra Part II.E.
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litigation two reasons. The first is that the high cost and delay full scale patent litigation is a
significant detriment to both good and bad patent holders alike. The second is that good patent
holders still face a significant chance of losing in federal court because of the uncertainties of
litigation generally, the risk of judicial error and fluctuations in patent law doctrine.252 Figure 4
illustrates this point using the same sliding scale of patent validity as in Figure 3.253 Just as in
Figure 3, the closer a patent is to the left hand side of the scale the more likely it is to be upheld
(or found to be infringed) by a court. Figure 4 depicts four patents, Patent A has a 95% chance of
being found to be valid, Patent B has 60% chance, Patent C has a 50% chance and Patent D has a
5% chance.
Figure 4(a): Patents at Risk if Litigated

At risk if litigated
Valid

Invalid
A

BC
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Figure 4(b): Patents at Risk Under Post-grant Review

Post grant
review
Valid

Invalid
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D

As Figure 4(a) illustrates, although Patent D is far more likely to be invalidated through
litigation, Patents B and C are also at risk. In contrast, as depicted in Figure 4(b), the narrower
scope of post-grant review should only place Patent D in jeopardy. Good patent holders should
only face a very slight risk from post-grant review if post-grant review is only intended to weed
out patents that clearly fail to satisfy the statutory grounds of patentability. Post-grant review will
not generally be a viable method for determining the validity of Patents B and C because the
information required to make such fine-grained determinations will typically not be available at
such an early stage. In addition (as discussed in more detail below) the expected cost of
retaliation in the form of post-grant review should be much lower for good patents than for bad
ones because good patents actually benefit from being subjected to the review process.
Finally, Post-grant review will have a differential impact on bad patents by reducing
uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent quality. As discussed in relation to
the CF-model, would-be patent challengers face significant information costs in assessing patent
quality. When a firm first receives some notification that it may be infringing another person’s
patent rights it needs to form a view as to the both the merits of that allegation and the likelihood
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that the patent holder will pursue it. Obtaining this information is costly because bad patent
holders will go as far as possible to imitate good patent holders in terms of the royalties they
demand and their apparent willingness to go to court. Consequently, uncertainty and information
asymmetries relating to patent quality have a leveling out effect, they increase the targets
willingness to accept a license from bad patent holders and reduce their willingness to accept a
license from good patent holders.
Post-grant review ameliorates this problem by providing a more credible signal of patent
quality – patents that survive post-grant review are more likely to be taken seriously in the
market than ones that have never been tested. If post-grant review functions as intended, it will
not only expose patents that should never have been granted, it will also signal the merits of
patents that are reviewed and not found invalid. Not only does post-grant review provide a way
to screen out some bad patents, it also provides credible information to the market about good
patents. In this way, post-grant review provides a signal of patent quality for good patents that
bad patent holders face great costs in imitating. Furthermore, if the model for post-grant review
we propose in Part IV of this article is adopted, patents that survive post-grant review will not
only appear stronger, they will be entitled to a stronger presumption of validity in litigation.
D. Assessing Patent Reform on the Basis of differential impact
The purpose of this section was to directly apply the differential impact test to a broad
survey of current patent reform proposals, including those embodied in the latest version of the
House Bill and the Senate Bill. Before summarizing our conclusions it is important to stress that
we are not suggesting that reforms that are unlikely to have a differential impact on bad patents
are necessarily ill-conceived; we are simply arguing that such reforms should not be a legislative
priority at this time.

87

PATENT REFORM AND DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT

Our main conclusions with respect to the differential impact potential for the reforms
analyzed in this article are as follows. In applying the differential impact test to the multitude of
examination reforms that have been suggested we noted that proposals which simply call for the
optimization of current resources should be considered to be neutral in terms differential impact.
In contrast, although devoting additional resources to patent examination is unlikely to have a
differential impact on bad patents that would justify the additional expenditure. However, we
did conclude that the three examination reforms proposed under the House Bill – first-to-file,
pre-grant opposition and mandatory publication of all patent applications after 18 months – are
all justified under a differential impact analysis.254
Doctrinal reforms generally did not fare well when assessed against the differential
impact Standard. Of the four main areas of doctrinal reform reviewed, only narrowing the scope
of willful infringement is strongly recommended under a differential impact analysis.
Post-grant review and other changes to the structure of patent litigation have significant
potential to create a differential impact on bad patents. Specifically, we concluded that feeshifting may encourage good patent holders to pursue their cases while simultaneously
discouraging bad patent holders. Proposals relating to bounties and cooperative patent challenges
not did not appear to be justified in terms of differential impact. Of all the reforms surveyed,
establishing a forum for the post-grant review of issued patents has the most potential to
discourage and devalue bad patents without undermining the value of good patents. Post-grant
review has three key advantages in this respect: (i) it will provide a low cost method of
challenging patents and thus prevent bad patent holders from hiding behind the high cost of
federal court litigation; (ii) it will increase the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad
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patent without significantly increasing the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a good
patent; and (iii) it will reduce uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent quality.

PART IV.

MULTISTAGE POST-GRANT REVIEW

Under the differential impact test elaborated in this article, we have proposed that the
current legislative push in relation to patent reform should be specifically targeted to address
problems related to bad patents. To reiterate, Congress should defer consideration of reforms that
attempt to either strengthen or weaken the exclusive rights of patent holders generally in favor of
reforms that are likely to raise the costs of obtaining or enforcing bad patents significantly more
than they raise the costs of obtaining or enforcing good patents.
As discussed in the previous Part, the differential impact test supports the adoption of
some kind of system of post-grant review In this Part we explain how the differential impact test
not only supports the idea of post-grant review in general, but also how it can be applied to
building a better model for post-grant review than those currently on the table. In short, looking
at post-grant review through the lens of differential impact leads us to propose a very different
kind of system to that currently embodied in the House Bill, the Senate Bill or those proposed by
the FTC, the NAS and various other commentators.
There are three key differences between our proposal and other variations of post-grant
review. First we propose the adoption of a variable presumption of validity such that: (i) issued
patents would only receive a weak presumption of validity (i.e. they would not be subject to the
clear and convincing evidence standard); (ii) patents that have been unsuccessfully challenged in
post-grant review would be entitled to strong presumption of validity (including the clear and
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convincing evidence standard); and (iii) rather than automatically invalidating a patent that is
successfully challenged in post-grant review, such patents should merely be weakened by
attaching a presumption of invalidity.
Second, we propose a multiple stage system of post-grant review, (“MPGR”) with two
distinct stages in order to balance the goal of greater scrutiny for bad patents with the need to
minimize potential harassment of good patents. The main benefit of post-grant review should be
that it allows potential infringers a low cost opportunity to correct what they believe to be
obvious errors by the patent office. However, if that opportunity is made too freely available, it
may be over used by well resourced potential infringers to chill the assertion of good patents.
Finding the right balance between lowering the cost of challenging bad patents and preventing
harassment of good patents can be achieved by using multiple stages of review under the MPGR
process.
Third, we propose bringing questions of claim construction into post-grant review so that
both sides of the bad patent phenomenon can be addressed. Patents that should never have been
issued receive most of the attention in the bad patent debate, however the hyper-assertion of
vaguely worded claims has at least as much potential to damage the incentive function of the
patent system.255 To meaningfully address the bad patent phenomenon, post-grant review must
find a way to deal with patents that may be legitimate in one sense but are illegitimately asserted
beyond their natural scope.
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In Part I we explained that the term bad patent should be reserved for patents that are asserted to cover a
product or activity that no reasonable fact finder could find it covered. See supra Part I.B.
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A. A Variable Presumption of Validity
Differential impact analysis indicates that calls for the abolition of the clear and
convincing evidence standard may be misconceived.256 While it is true that the application of the
clear and convincing evidence standard in relation to patent validity is difficult to reconcile with
the realities of modern patent examination, it does not seem likely that lowering the standard of
proof required to challenge patent validity will have a differential impact on bad patents. The
main reason for this is that the presumption of validity and the clear and convincing evidence
standard together provide significant protection against adjudicative error for good patents as
well as bad ones.
However, none of the arguments in favor of retaining the strong form of the presumption
of validity (i.e. presumption of validity plus convincing evidence standard) require that all
patents should be subject to the one evidentiary standard. As an alternative to simply keeping or
abolishing the strong form of the presumption of validity, we propose the application of a
variable presumption of validity tied to post-grant review.257
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Under the current system an applicant can obtain a patent without definitively proving
anything at the patent office, nonetheless, once that patent issues it can only be invalidated
through clear and convincing evidence.259 Post-grant review provides us with an excellent
256

See supra Part III.B.

257

Mark Lemley and his coauthors have also proposed a variable presumption of validity in a slightly
different context. Their proposal is that “applicants should be allowed to “gold-plate” their patents by paying for the
kind of searching review that would merit a strong presumption of validity’ but otherwise a weaker form of the
presumption of validity should apply. Lemley, What to do About Bad Patents, supra note 217.
258

Although this may sound like a radical shift from current practice, it must be noted that current
reexamination procedures allow the presumption of validity to be overcome preponderance of the evidence and can
result in the cancellation of the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.555. Note also, that in some pre-Federal Circuit cases the
presumption of validity was eliminated if the prior art in court was not before the patent office.
259

See, e.g., Kegel Company, Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997). (Invalidity
must be established by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence).

91

PATENT REFORM AND DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT

opportunity to revisit the one-size-fits-all application of the strong form of the presumption of
validity with something that is both more rational and more nuanced.
The presumption of invalidity means that a patent that is successfully challenged would
still be valid in a technical sense but that if the patent holder wished to enforce it against a
potential infringer she would face an uphill battle in court. The presumption of invalidity quite
literally means that the patent is presumed to be invalid as an evidentiary matter, but that if the
patent holder can show, on the preponderance of the evidence, that their patent is valid and
infringed she is entitled to enforce her rights. In that case the patent would then be entitled to the
strong presumption of validity.
We propose that issued patents should generally only be entitled to a weak presumption
of validity: i.e. they should be presumed valid, but could be invalidated on the preponderance of
the evidence rather than the onerous clear and convincing evidence standard. Once a patent has
been challenged in post-grant review and is upheld, it should then be entitled to strong
presumption of validity. Treating reviewed and unreviewed patents differently is consistent with
the differential impact approach because patents that have been unsuccessfully challenged via
post-grant review (or litigation) are less likely to be bad patents. We can’t be certain that an
unsuccessfully challenged patent will not later be shown to be invalid, but we can be relatively
confident that it will not be easily invalidated, as such it is less likely to be a bad patent.
We further propose that rather than automatically invalidating a patent that is successfully
challenged in post-grant review, such patents should merely be weakened by attaching a
presumption of invalidity. This is a significant departure from the current reexamination system
and from the post-grant review proposals presently before Congress. By lowering the stakes of
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post-grant review, the presumption of invalidity makes the lack of appeal rights and other
procedural safeguards with respect to post-grant review more palatable.260
One of the advantages of merely applying a presumption of invalidity to a patent that is
discredited in post-grant review is that it facilitates a streamlined process within the patent office
that does not deprive the patent holder of due process.261 Patent holders would not be able to
appeal patent review decisions, but their ability to pursue subsequent litigation should be an
effective substitute. We expect that in most cases a patent holder who loses in post-grant review
will see the writing on the wall and abandon attempts to enforce the patent; however, those
patent holders who believe that the patent office has incorrectly ruled against their patent still
have the option of proving the validity of their patent in litigation. In some ways, the model of
post-grant review we propose here is more about information revelation than adjudication.
Nonetheless, in terms of the CF-model, post-grant review will function as a low cost form of
adjudication for a large number of cases, even if it is not the final forum of dispute for all
controversies.
The difference between the variable presumption of validity and the current patent system
is illustrated on Table 1, below. As the table makes clear, the current system is indiscriminate in
that it subjects reviewed and unreviewed patents to the same strong form of the presumption of
validity. The current system also suffers in that both post-grant review and litigation can lead to
exactly the same outcome, thus setting up the potential for contradictory outcomes. Our proposal
adopts an escalating structure that acknowledges the differences between reviewed and
unreviewed patents and between post-grant review and actual litigation.
260

See infra Part IV.D.
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Under the current reexamination system decisions of the patent office are appealable to the Patent and
Appeals Board; See 35 U.S.C. § 134.
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Table 1: The Presumption of Validity

Current System

Reform Proposal

Patent issued

Strong Presumption of Weak Presumption of
Validity
Validity

Post-grant review
upholds patent

Strong Presumption of Strong Presumption of
Validity
Validity

Patent invalidated
Post-grant
review/reexamination
goes against patent
Patent litigation (PH
loses on the issue of
validity)

Patent invalidation

Presumption of
invalidity
Patent invalidation

B. Multi-stage Post-grant Review
One of the main fears in relation to post-grant review is that it will be subject to the same
kinds of strategic abuse that plagues the current patent litigation system. Post-grant review can
improve the patent system by allowing for more focused examination of patents that appear to
have been improperly granted, but a badly structured system of post-grant review may also allow
potential infringers to harass patent owners whose patents are not so suspect. To address this
concern, we propose that post-grant review should be divided into two phases such that patent
challengers have to essentially pre-qualify for the right to challenge the patent. The current
patent system limits the opportunity to challenge a patent to those persons who (a) have a
reasonable apprehension of being sued by the patent holder and (b) have several hundred
thousand dollars to spend on federal court litigation.262 These restrictions prevent parties without
a strong direct interest from challenging bad patents. For post-grant review, we propose a very
different kind of limitation on the right to challenge the validity of a patent. Post-grant review
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should be open to any person who is able to convince the patent office that there is a reasonable
chance that one or more of the patent claims was issued in error. Accordingly, the first stage of
post-grant review should be used as a screening device according to whether the challenge rises
to the level of a “substantial new question in relation to patentability.”
1.

Stage One

Under our proposal the first stage of post-grant review has three key features: (i) the
requirement that the challenger establishes that a substantial new question of patentability in
relation to the patent; (ii) it is conducted on an ex parte basis, without the participation of the
patent holder; and (iii) the patent office’s determination on the initial phase of the challenge
would become a matter of public record.
Substantial New Question of Patentability:
Stage one of the system of post-grant review that we propose would be require any
person wishing to challenge the validity of an issued patent to satisfy a patent office examiner
(not the person who examined the patent in the first place) that there is a substantial new
question of patentability in relation to the patent.263 For example, a challenger could submit prior
art that was not reviewed by the examiner and argue that the prior art demonstrated that the
claimed invention was not in fact novel at the time the patent holder “invented” it.264
The substantial new question of patentability test clearly limits the situations in which
challengers can subject a patent owner to post-grant review. One likely objection to this
requirement is that it will not allow for the review of invalid patents where the examiner did
263

Currently, reexamination requires a finding of a substantial new question of patentability based on the
prior art submissions. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2201 (8th Ed., Rev. 2, May 2004); 37
CFR § 1.515.
264

See 35 USC § 102. (Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent).

95

PATENT REFORM AND DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT

consider all the relevant material, but simply misunderstood the technology. This limitation is
necessary from the perspective of differential impact because post-grant review is not intended to
catch every mistake made by the patent office, nor is it meant to function as a total substitution
for litigation. Pre-qualification will reduce the universe of reviewable patents down to those
where errors are most likely and where an administrative system can most efficiently deal with
them.
One of the main advantages of this two stage structure is that it allows a potential
infringer to can obtain the benefit of the patent office’s opinion on “newly discovered” art
references at a very low cost. If the potential infringer is right, and there is a substantial new
question of patentability, she is in a good position to fend off the patent holder’s demands for a
license. If she is wrong, it is the patent holder who is advantaged because the patent office will
publicly announce that, even in light of the challenger’s prior art, the patent is nonetheless not
invalid - all at no cost to the patent holder. The differential impact here should be obvious: bad
patents are more easily challenged, whereas good patents are actually strengthened by the first
stage of the MPGR process.
Stage One Proceedings Ex Parte
An important feature of the first stage of post-grant review is that it takes place on an ex
parte basis, without the involvement of, or possibly even the knowledge of, the patent holder.
The patent holder only becomes involved in the review process if a patent examiner can be
convinced that the challenger has raised an objection to the patent that merits post-grant review
and that is appropriate to the post-grant review forum. Patent holders will naturally be concerned
that their rights may be unfairly affected by the first stage of the MPGR process. However,
excluding them from the first stage of post-grant review actually benefits them by reducing the
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possibility that post-grant review is used by challengers as a form of harassment. Another
benefit of the ex parte nature of the first stage of MPGR is that it forces potential infringers to
disclose what may be their best evidence at an early stage in the proceeding, before the patent
holder has incurred any cost in defending her patent.
Mandatory Publication of Stage One Findings:
As previously discussed, one of the problems with relying on private parties to challenge
invalid or over reaching patent assertions is that even those parties that do have the incentive to
start such an action may well lack the incentive to finish it.265 Individual challengers will often
be better off settling with the patent holder for a trivial amount of money than investing more
resources into their challenge only to have to share their victory with all of their competitors.
Early settlement can be efficient from the point of view of the parties, but it means that any
future challenger must reinvent the wheel. Also, assuming that the terms of settlement are kept
secret, other potential challengers don’t even get the advantage of knowing how strong the
parties thought the patent was.
Under our proposal, a challenger is not forced to pursue the MPGR process to its final
conclusion, but the patent office’s stage one determination on the initial challenge would become
a matter of public record. The patent office’s findings with respect to the first stage would be
published and any subsequent challenger would be entitled to use those findings in post-grant
review or litigation.

265

See supra Part II.C.
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What is the significance of these published findings? The patent is not invalid at this
stage,266 but the first hurdle to MPGR has been cleared. From this point on, it will be easier for a
third party to pick up where the initial challenger left off, even if the initial challenger is
appeased by the patent holder. This reduces the early settlement problems discussed in Part II.
Also, the public recording of the patent office’s determination as to the existence of a substantial
new question of patentability conveys significant information to the market about the likely
quality of patent: it provides a low cost method of clearly flagging at least some bad patents
without raising the costs to good patent holders.
2.

Stage Two

The second stage of MPGR consists of a review of the challenge by a review panel of the
patent office. Ideally this review panel would consist of three experienced patent examiners,
none of whom had made a decision with respect to the patent at any other time. This review
would take the form of an adversarial proceeding in which any interested party would be allowed
to make written submissions.
At this stage, any party – including the original challenger, the patent holder, or a new
challenger – may force the continuation of the MPGR process or join the MPGR process. In the
case where the original challenger does not continue the process and no new challenger picks up
the process, the patent holder can remove any lingering doubts as to the validity of her patent by
continuing, on their own, with arguments to the patent office.
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Similarly, the patent is not subject to a presumption of invalidity of our proposal for a variable
presumption of validity is accepted.
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C. Claim Construction and Post-grant Review
The current patent system does not provide any mechanism for dealing with ambiguous
patent claims other than federal court litigation. A unique feature of our proposal is that it would
bring questions of claim construction into post-grant review such that both invalid and hyperasserted patents can be addressed.
Poor quality examination, the ambiguity of language and the unpredictable path of
technology all lead to ambiguous patent claims. In consequence, established patent holders and
entrepreneurial patent collectors have an incentive to take a second look at old patents relating to
one technology to determine whether it can plausibly be asserted in relation to some new
technology. BT’s attempt to assert patent rights in relation to internet hyperlinks explemplifies
this problem.267 The recent Superguide litigation is also illustrative. In the 2004 case of
Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises268 the question was whether a patent relating to “a
system for electronically controllably viewing updateable information” on an analog television
should also be construed to cover digital television technology that was not developed until well
after the patent issued.269
How can post-grant review address the over-assertion of patents that may nonetheless
have a core of validity? Our proposal is that post-grant review should be tailored to allow
potential infringers to negate certain claim constructions.270 For example assume that a potential
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See supra notes 47 and 48 and accompanying text.
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358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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See also, Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101

(2005).
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This is analogous to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s practice of issuing “no-action” letters.
See, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm. (An individual or entity who is not certain whether a particular
product, service, or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may request a "no-action" letter
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infringer has reason to be concerned about a patent whose claims could be construed to mean
either A or B, where meaning A is fairly narrow and would not implicate the activities of the
potential infringer but meaning B is much broader and would implicate the activities of the
potential infringer.
It would be advantageous if the potential infringer was able to put the issue of claim
construction to the patent office through the process of post-grant review. However, the problem
with asking the patent office to adjudicate claim construction is that any construction given by
the patent office may prove to be just as fallible as the initial claim language. In other words, any
definitive claim construction rendered by the patent office may simply provide a second set of
words that will be ambiguous and subject to the unpredictable path of technology for the
remainder of the life of the patent. There is, however, a solution to this problem.
Although the patent office may be in no better position to say what the true meaning of
patent claim should be after post-grant review than it was at the time the patent issued, it should
be able to determine what the patent does not mean.271 Under our proposal, potential infringers
would present the patent office with a negative claim construction. For example, a developer of
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology might be concerned that a particular patent
dealing very generally with packet loss might be infringed by the developer’s specific techniques
that deal with packet loss in the context of VOIP.272

from the SEC staff.) Michael Carroll has proposed a similar innovation with respect to the fair use doctrine in
copyright law, see Michael Carroll, Fixing Fair Use (2005) (working paper on file with the authors.)
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Under the current law, the patent office is supposed to give claims “their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification” both at the time of examination and under reexamination. Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1).
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See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,016,513 claims “a method of preventing packet loss during transfer of a
plurality of data packets between a network interface card and a host operating system of the computer system.”
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In this example, the developer should be able to ask the patent office to confirm its
understanding that the patent does not apply to the type of packet loss prevention used in VOIP –
a proposition that the patent office may, or may not agree with. Any question of claim
construction presented in this fashion should in fact contain two distinct questions: (1) does the
claim encompass meaning B? and (2) if so, is the claim valid? The reason for this second
element is that there is an inherent link between claim scope and validity. For many patent
owners broad claim construction is a mixed blessing. On the one hand broad claims increase the
likelihood that the patent will confer economic power if valid, but on the hand, the broader a
claim becomes, the more likely it is to be found invalid on the basis of lack of novelty,
obviousness, lack of enablement, or improper written description.
Chiron v. Genentech273 illustrates this problem nicely. In Chiron v. Genentech the court
had to decide the proper scope of the patent holder’s rights with respect to the isolation/creation
of monoclonal antibodies that were capable of binding with the human antigen associated with
breast cancer.274 The patent holder had developed a number of these antigens using hybridoma
technology developed in the early 1980’s. Hybridoma cells are used to produce monoclonal
antibodies by interacting with cells from an animal that has been challenged with the relevant
antigen.275 A significant problem in medical applications of this technique is that the end product
contains murine (mouse derived) antibodies that are strongly rejected by the human immune
system.276 In the late 1980’s scientists developed a way to overcome this problem by using
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See Thomas A. Waldmann, Immunotherapy: Past, Present and Future. Nature Medicine 9, 269 –277
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recombinant DNA technology. Under this approach, DNA that encodes the binding portion of
monoclonal mouse antibodies is merged with human antibodies to produce “chimeric” or
“humanized” antibodies.277 These antibodies are far more useful in medical applications because
of lower rates of rejection by the human immune system.278
The question for the court in Chiron was whether the patent claims covered all creation
of monoclonal antibodies that were capable of binding with human antigen associated with
breast cancer, or whether they were limited to those produced through the plaintiff’s hybridoma
technology. This question was significant because one of the patent holder’s competitors had
developed superior monoclonal antibodies through the application of recombinant DNA
technology. Illustrating the duel nature of broad claim construction, the court ruled that the
patent claims applied to both methods of producing the antibodies, but also that the patent holder
had failed to meet the enablement requirements with respect to that technology. Indeed,
according to the Federal Circuit, there was no way the plaintiff’s main patent could have enabled
Chimeric antibody technology because that technology had not been invented at the relevant
time.279
Post-grant review should be structured to allow potential infringers (or other interested
parties) to present negative claim constructions for the patent office to review because the
breadth of claim construction is inherently tied to claim validity. As the Chiron case illustrates,
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The court held that genetically engineered antibodies, specifically chimeric antibodies, first appeared as
a successful technology in the literature of this art field in May 1984. This new technology arose after the patent
holder’s initial filing date and thus was, by definition, outside the bounds of the enablement requirement. The Court
further held the patent holder’s later applications in 1985 and 1986 also failed to meet the enablement requirement
because even though the technology to genetically engineer chimeric antibodies existed at that point, in order to
claim rights with respect to a nascent technology the patent would have to have provided a “specific and useful
teaching.”
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broad claim construction is a two edged sword. While an expansive reading of the patent’s
claims may help the patent owner assert her rights more broadly, it may also jeopardize the
validity of the patent. Broadly interpreted patent claims expand the universe of potentially
invalidating prior art, and they also makes it more difficult to meet the statutory requirements of
written description and enablement.280
The patent office would have essentially three different possible response to a request for
a negative claim construction: (1) determine that the claim in question does not cover the defined
product process or method; (2) determine that the claim in question does cover the defined
product process or method but that in light of that construction the patent should not have been
issued; (3) neither 1 nor 2 (which carries the implication that the claim in question covers the
defined product process or method). Where the patent office determines that the claim in
question does not cover the defined product process or method (option 1), that negative
construction would have to be taken into account in any subsequent litigation. Where the patent
office determines that the claim in question does cover the defined product process or method
but that in light of that construction the patent should not have been issued (option 2), the patent
would be presumptively invalid with respect to that claim. Where the patent office makes neither
of those determinations (option 3), the patent would be entitled to a strong presumption of
validity with respect to an infringer who fell within the specifications of the negative
construction.
How does this relate to our proposed threshold of a substantial new question of
patentability? Essentially, we envisage that the patent office would review applications for a
280

35 USC § 112. (The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out her invention).
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negative claim construction to determine whether they raised a significant or serious question.
Although this is not the same as substantial new question of patentability, it could be employed
in a similar filtering fashion. The patent office should be given a broad discretion to decide
whether to consider applications for negative claim constructions; it should also be allowed to
develop an appropriate filtering standard under its rule making authority.281
D. Disputed Features of post-grant review
The procedural details of post-grant review are of critical importance because post-grant
review only makes sense if it presents a viable low cost alternative to litigation. Accordingly,
commentary typically focuses generally on the attractiveness of post-grant review to potential
challengers.282 However, the question of differential cost is just as significant as cost in general.
As we have argued at length in this article, an important criterion should be whether any
proposed element of post-grant review imposes higher costs on bad patents than it does on good
patents. This leads us to make the following recommendations with respect to other disputed
features of post-grant review:
1.

Issues of Format, Scope and Discovery

The fundamental design constraint for post-grant review is cost. If post-grant review is
going to work as a genuine alternative to litigation, it must be significantly more affordable than
patent litigation. Controlling the legal costs of post-grant review requires eliminating the two
greatest expenses of litigation: discovery and oral argument. In contrast to the proposals for
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Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We
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Working Paper No. LE05-004, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=688005 (describing how many “bad”
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limited discovery in the House and Senate Bills283 and the recommendations of the NAS and the
FTC, 284 we believe that so long as the scope of reviewable issues is kept narrow, discovery will
be unnecessary.
This, in turn, requires that the scope of issues under review in post-grant review be
limited so that the exclusion of discovery and oral argument does not lead to injustice. Consistent
with the House Bill and the Senate Bill, we believe the scope of post-grant review should be
limited to issues relating to patentability. This ensures that the patent office can review the patent
without any inquiry into the inventor’s state of mind or personal knowledge at the time of the
application. The practical effect of this recommendation is that post-grant review would extend
to novelty, obviousness, and enablement, but would not include issues such as statutory bars,
best mode or inequitable conduct. Given these limitations, both discovery and oral arguments
should not be necessary for the parties to make effective arguments concerning patentability.
2.

Window of Opportunity

If post-grant review is going to provide a real alternative to litigation, it must be available
to potential infringers at any point in time after the patent has issued. The NAS, the FTC, and the
current House Bill all recommend a limited time period during which post-grant review may be
utilized, varying from 9 months to a year.285 The NAS further proposes a trigger allowing post-
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Patent Act of 2005, supra note 13, at § 328 (draft amendment to H.R. 2795 recommended discovery for
depositions of persons submitting affidavits or declarations as well as any additional discovery that is “required in
the interest of justice”).
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See NAS REPORT, supra note 23, at 96; FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.

285
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grant review whenever the patent holder alleges infringement by lawsuit or notice of intent to file
suit.286
In contrast, we believe that post-grant review must be available for the life of the patent.
Critics suggest that the opposition period be limited for a variety of reasons: a limited period
reduces the misuse of post-grant review proceedings by challengers who wish to delay or injure
the patent holder;287 property law favors a settled title because this allows value expectations to
settle, thereby “engendering commercial stability and fostering the market for patent licensing;288
and efficiency results from reducing uncertainty over patent validity.289 While these are real
concerns, we see more immediate and definable negative effects that result from a limited time
period for post-grant review.
First, a limited time period for post-grant review creates a burden on firms to actively and
closely monitor every patent office proceeding for subject matter which relates to their current or
future products. Interested third parties who fail to monitor patent office proceedings would
reside in an information void. They would be precluded in many instances from availing
themselves of the low cost post-grant review alternative to litigation. This monitoring is an
across the board increase in costs.
Second, if bad patent holders know that competitors do not closely monitor patent office
proceedings, the bad patent holders have an incentive to then wait until the close of the
opposition period before asserting their patents. Similarly, holders of good patents who are
286
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nonetheless uncertain of their patent’s strength have an incentive to wait until the limited
opposition period closes before they assert their rights. If no limited opposition period existed,
then it would make no difference when holders of good patents asserted their rights; therefore,
they would assert their rights whenever it became strategically optimal.
Third, it is relatively uncommon for patents to be litigated within the first nine months
after issuance.290 According to John Allison et al, patent litigation, on average, reaches a peak
during the third year following issuance and continues at a significant pace through at least the
fifteenth year following issuance.291
3.

Estoppel

It is widely agreed that the current inter-partes reexamination system has been
underutilized because challengers who fail to persuade the patent office in reexamination are
estopped from raising the same arguments in subsequent litigation.292 The House Bill repeats this
short-coming with respect to post-grant review. Specifically, the House Bill bars a challenger
from raising “any issue of fact or law actually decided and necessary to the determination” of an
opposition proceeding once a final determination of that opposition has been made.293 The House
Bill provides an exception for a challenger who demonstrates that there is additional material
factual evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered or presented in the opposition
proceeding.294
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The Senate Bill takes a slightly different approach. That Bill proposes a limited form of
estoppel for challenges initiated within a year of the issuance of the patent and a broader form of
estoppel for any challenge initiated thereafter.295 Under the limited estoppel approach, a
challenger would only be estopped from raising an issue of fact or law that it did in fact raise in
opposition. In contrast, under the broader form of estoppel potential infringers wishing to avail
themselves of post-grant opposition would be barred from subsequently raising any grounds they
raised or could have raised in that proceeding.296
We disagree with both the House and the Senate Bills in this respect because post-grant
review can only be effective if potential infringers are willing to use it. Accordingly, we propose
entirely removing estoppel from post-grant review. The argument against removing estoppel is
that it serves to prevent repetitive or harassing proceedings and litigation.

There are two

problems with this reasoning. First, it assumes that repetitive or harassing litigation is a more
significant problem than an under-utilized system of post-grant review. Second, there are better
ways of protecting the legitimate interests of patent holders and preventing the inappropriate use
of post-grant review. For example, as we have already proposed, post-grant review could be
divided into two phases such that patent challengers have to essentially pre-qualify for the right
to challenge the patent.
4.

Amendment of Claims During Post-grant Review

We propose that amendments be allowed during post-grant review, but that they be
subject to the same adversarial proceedings as all other patentability considerations during postgrant review. In some respects, this differs from other recommendations. The NAS report is
295
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silent on this matter.297 The FTC recommends allowing amendments, but does not address the
issue of whether they may be argued against by the challenger.298 It would seem imprudent not to
allow the expertise and information forwarding capabilities of the challenger to be heard.
Though the challenger may be motivated by differing concerns than the patent office, the patent
office would still be the ultimate arbiter of patentability issues and should be able to separate
rhetoric from truly relevant prior art and argument. The undesirable alternative is to allow
uncontested amendments which could, eventually, be subject to another round of post-grant
review challenges based on new submissions by the current challenger. This is an inefficient use
of resources and the probability of later challenges should be eliminated through the use of a
more timely challenge during the amendment process.
E. The Implications of Differential Impact for Post-grant Review
The differential impact criteria we have established in this article suggests the
implementation of a very different kind of post-grant review system from those that are currently
on the table. The first point of departure is the variable presumption of validity. The main
advantage of applying a variable presumption of validity is that it differentiates based on patent
characteristics that are tied to validity in a probabilistic sense. Patents that are issued and never
challenged have probably only been scrutinized for between 18 and 41.5 hours;299 whereas a
patent that has been subject to post-grant review will have been subjected to hundreds of hours of
intensive examination. A patent which is upheld after post-grant review seems much more likely
to be valid than one which has not. Another advantage of the variable presumption of validity is
that facilitates a streamlined post-grant review system that does not overlap with judicial
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proceedings by applying a presumption of invalidity to patents that are successfully challenged
in post-grant review. Our proposal is that post-grant review should not be the subject of any
appeal; rather, a patent holder who believes that the patent office was in error should simply
attempt to enforce her rights in court. If she is successful, the patent office’s post-grant review
determination is effectively overruled, if not, the ruling stands. This streamlined system will keep
the cost of post-grant review affordable and will also make it clear that post-grant review is not
simply an alternative forum for litigation.
The second point of departure between the system of post-grant review we envisage and
the current raft of legislative proposals is that we believe that post-grant review should be
comprised of two distinct stages. Under our proposed multi-stage post-grant review, challengers
would have to effectively earn the right to challenge a patent by convincing the patent office that
they were able to demonstrate some substantial new question of patentability that had not been
considered at the time the patent was initially examined. MPGR may be more efficient than a
single stage process because it allows potential infringers to resolve one of the major
uncertainties of patent litigation very early in the process. It is often the case that a potential
infringer will form the opinion that a particular piece of prior art is fatal to the validity of the
patent, but to test that opinion currently requires commitment to substantial litigation costs. This
filtering device will narrow those cases eligible for post-grant review down to instances where
there is obviously a significant question to be addressed. While this may allow a number of
invalid patents to escape post-grant review, it will also protect the majority of good patents from
unmeritorious post-grant review proceedings. Multi-stage post-grant review is essential to
ensuring that post-grant review has more impact on bad patents than on good ones by balancing
the need for low cost challenge with the need to protect patent holder from undue harassment.
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Our third point of departure with the current post-grant review proposals relates to claim
construction. Currently the only way a potential infringer can obtain any certainty with respect to
ambiguous patent claims is via federal court litigation. However, this is only an option to persons
who have a reasonable apprehension of being sued for infringement by the patent holder. This
seems overly restrictive because it does not provide any means whereby a person can test the
meaning of a patent claim without investing in activity that is potentially infringing. Our
proposal is that potential infringers should be able to negate certain claim constructions through
post-grant review.

CONCLUSION
Congressional efforts to address the crisis of confidence in the U.S. patent system have
failed up to the present day. If Congress is to have any hope of passing much needed legislative
reform to the Patent Act, the supporters of patent reform will have to unite behind a streamlined
set of proposals that directly address the most pressing and unambiguous defects of the current
patent system. To that end, we have proposed applying a test of differential impact to enable
Congress to prioritize those reforms which will discourage the acquisition and assertion of bad
patents without unduly prejudicing the interests of the holders of good patents. The differential
impact approach elucidated in this article has at least three distinct advantages over other efforts
to rewrite the patent system from the ground up. First, the differential impact approach provides
a mechanism by which to evaluate competing claims for legislative resources. Second, the
differential impact approach is an appropriate response to the empirical uncertainty surrounding
optimal patent scope. Third, differential impact is consistent with the need to take the legitimate
expectations of current stakeholders into account.
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The economic models developed in this article suggest that individuals and businesses
accused of patent infringement often have weak incentives to challenge bad patents (even if they
are fairly sure they are invalid). The economic models also demonstrate that patent holders have
strong incentives to demand royalties which are not in fact supported by the patents they hold.
These demands may be unsupported either because the patent is invalid, or because it is much
narrower in scope than the patent holder represents. The AF-model indicates that where targeting
costs are low and the prospect of retaliation is small, a rational patent holder will broadly assert
her patent even where the probability that any individual target will accept a license is low. The
AF-model is particularly useful in determining which proposed reforms are likely to have a
differential impact on bad patents because it indicates exposing patent holders to retaliation when
they assert their patents has the potential to create a differential cost between good patent holders
and bad patent holders.
In Part III of this article we have reviewed a wide range of reform proposals relating to
patent examination reform, substantive patent doctrine, the structure and procedures of patent
litigation. Of all the reforms surveyed, the one that (appears to us) to have the best potential for
differential impact is post-grant review.
The importance of post-grant review is highlighted by the economic models developed in
this article. First, the CF-model indicates that the high cost of federal court litigation shields bad
patents from scrutiny in many cases. Post-grant review will address this by providing a low cost
method of challenging patents. Second, the AF-model indicates that it would be more costly to
assert bad patents if the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent was significantly
higher than the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a good patent. Currently, both good and
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bad patents are placed at considerable risk in federal court litigation.300 However, in post-grant
review, only bad patents have any significant probability of being invalidated. Consequently, the
AF-model indicates that introducing a system of post-grant review would discourage the
assertion of bad patents without discouraging the assertion of good patents. Third, both the CFmodel and the AF-model indicate that uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent
quality are detrimental to good patents and advantageous to bad patents. Under a system of postgrant review, potential infringers will be able to resolve key questions relating to patent validity
more quickly and more cheaply than in federal court litigation. As a result, post-grant review will
also have a differential impact on bad patents by reducing uncertainty and information
asymmetries relating to patent quality.
In order to further demonstrate the utility of our differential impact approach, we have
applied the standard to sketching an outline of how past grant review should be implemented.
Interestingly, looking at post-grant review through the lens of differential impact leads us to
propose a very different kind of system to that currently embodied in the House Bill, the Senate
Bill or those proposed by the FTC, the NAS and various other commentators.301
Adopting the differential impact standard elaborated in this article will enable congress to
evaluate and prioritize competing patent reform proposals. As such, the differential impact test
provides a way out of the legislative quagmire that seems to have engulfed the patent reform
movement.

300

This is not to suggest the risk is the same regardless of the underlying validity of the patent.

301

The differences between our MPRG proposal and other versions of post-grant review are summarized at
the beginning of Part IV, supra.
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